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Waiver-in-Litigation: Eleventh Amendment
Immunity and the Voluntariness Question
GIL SEqFELD*
The Supreme Court's decision in College Savings Bank v. Florida Prepaid
Postsecondary Education Expense Board, 527 U.S. 666 (1999), sharply contracted
the number of instances in which constructive waivers of Eleventh Amendment
immunity may be exactedfrom the states. However, a set ofcases involving waiver-
in-litigation--cases in which waivers of sovereign immunity are implied from the
conduct of state officials during litigation-seem to have been undisturbed by the
College Savings decision. Like the Court's sovereign immunity jurisprudence
generally, these particular cases are predicated on affundamental rule ofEleventh
Amendment doctrine: A waiver of immunity is not valid if it is not voluntary. The
waiver-in-litigation cases teach that, in many cases, states' access to the federal
courts may be conditioned on waiver ofsovereign immunity without compromising
the voluntariness of the waiver. The "voluntariness principle"notwithstanding, the
Supreme Court has held that state-defendants do not waive their immunity from suit
by litigating on the merits in trial court. As a result, state-defendants may litigate on
the merits without risk; for if the state loses, it may retroactively revoke the
jurisdiction of the district court by asserting sovereign immunity on appeal. This
article offers a comprehensive picture of the Supreme Court's waiver-in-litigation
case law and scrutinizes the rule permitting late-stage claims of Eleventh
Amendment immunity. It argues that this rule is not required by the voluntariness
principle or any other rule of constitutional law and that it cannot be reconciled
with waiver-in-litigation jurisprudence generally. The article suggests two schemes
through which states' right to litigate on the merits in federal court might be
conditioned on waiver of immunity.
I. NTRODUCTION
The Supreme Court's controversial decision in Seminole Tribe of Florida v.
* Fellow, Princeton University Program in Law and Public Affairs; A.B., Harvard College;
J.D., Harvard Law School. I am very grateful to Richard Fallon for suggesting that I take up the
issues addressed in this article and to Dan Meltzer for advising me throughout the research and
writing process. Annie Small provided extremely useful comments on an earlier draft. Thanks also
to David Barron, Ben Gruenstein, and Ian Shapiro for helpful discussions, comments, and
suggestions. I am also enormously grateful to Christine Jolls for her guidance and mentoring. Most
important, I would like to thank Debra Chopp for her encouragement and support and for countless
hours spent discussing the questions taken up here.
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Florida' made it much more difficult for litigants to sue states in federal court for
violations of federal law.2 In that case, the Court held that the Eleventh Amendment
precludes Congress from abrogating state sovereign immunity when legislating
pursuant to its Article I powers.3 As a result, many individuals wishing to sue states
for violations of federal law were left to seek recourse in state courts. Three years
later, in Alden v. Maine,4 the Supreme Court eliminated this vehicle for relief as well,
by holding that (1) the Eleventh Amendment secures for the states immunity from suit
in state court for violations of federal law, and (2) Congress may not abrogate this
immunity when legislating pursuant to its Article I powers.5 After Seminole Tribe,
some commentators suggested that aggressive use of the constructive waiver doctrine
might reopen, at least partially, the door slammed shut by that decision.6 Under this
doctrine, when Congress clearly expresses its intent to subject states to suit if they
engage in certain conduct, states constructively consent to federal jurisdiction by
choosing to do so. While the Seminole Tribe and Alden decisions prevented Congress
from affirmatively stripping states of their sovereign immunity, the decisions did not
1517 U.S. 44 (1996).
2 See generally Daniel J. Meltzer, The Seminole Decision and State Sovereign Immunity,
1996 SuP. CT. REV. I (discussing the implications of Seminole Tribe). The controversy
surrounding this decision is rooted in differing conceptions of what classes of suits the Eleventh
Amendment was designed to prohibit. Fuel for the controversy was provided by William A.
Fletcher, A Historical Interpretation of the Eleventh Amendment: A Narrow Construction of an
Affirmative Grant ofJurisdiction Rather than a Prohibition Against Jurisdiction, 35 STAN. L. REV.
1033 (1983) and John J. Gibbons, The Eleventh Amendment and State Sovereign Immunity: A
Reinterpretation, 83 COLUM. L. REV. 1889 (1983). These articles suggest that the Eleventh
Amendment precludes suits against states only when jurisdiction rests on the state-citizen diversity
clause of Article IM. In federal question or admiralty cases, they argue, the federal courts may
exercise jurisdiction over state defendants, the Eleventh Amendment notwithstanding. For
examples of this "diversity interpretation" at work in the Supreme Court, see Seminole Tribe, 517
U.S. at 109-16 (Souter, J., dissenting); Atascadero State Hospital v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234,258-
302 (1985) (Brennan, J., dissenting). In Seminole Tribe, Chief Justice Rehnquist contended that in
forwarding the diversity interpretation, other Justices had "disregard[ed] our case law in favor of a
theory cobbled together from law review articles and [their] own version of historical events."
Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 68.
3 See Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 72-73.
4 527 U.S. 706, 754 (1999).
5 See generally The Supreme Court, 1998 Term-Leading Cases, 113 HARv. L. REV. 200-13
(1999) (analyzing Alden and exploring the decision's ramifications for the possibility of keeping
states within the bounds of the law).
6 See Kit Kinports, Implied WaiverAfter Seminole Tribe, 82 MINN. L. REV. 793,795 (1998)
(noting that the "doctrine of implied or constructive waiver-whereby a state impliedly waives its
Eleventh Amendment immunity-is still alive after Seminole Tribe"); Note, Reconceptualizing the
Role of Constructive WaiverAfter Seminole Tribe, 112 HARv. L. REV. 1759, 1760 (1999) (arguing
that "Chief Justice Rehnquist's majority opinion in Seminole provides both the occasion and the
impetus to liberate the doctrine of constructive waiver from the confines of recent decisions
limiting, and ultimately obviating, its application") (footnotes omitted),
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to impede Congress's ability to condition participation in certain regulated activities 7
or enjoyment of certain benefits8 on a state's willingness to forego its immunity from
suit.
On the same day that it decided Alden, however, the Supreme Court dramatically
reduced the constructive waiver possibilities. In College Savings Bank v. Florida
Prepaid Postsecondary Education Expense Board,9 the Court held that a state's right
to participate in "otherwise lawful activity" may not be conditioned on waiver of
sovereign immunity. ° Applied to the facts of College Savings, this rule dictated that
the State of Florida did not consent to federal jurisdiction by marketing and
administering its student loan program.'" This was so even though the Lanham Act, a
federal statute regulating false and misleading advertising, purported to condition
state participation in this activity on waiver of Eleventh Amendment immunity." The
College Savings majority explained that constructive waivers, such as that contained
in the Lanham Act, "permit[ted] Congress to circumvent the anti-abrogation holding
of Seminole Tribe" and were therefore constitutionally infirm.13
The scaling back of constructive waiver effectuated by the College Savings
decision is meant to protect states from federal statutes that coerce waiver of
immunity. The Court's ruling in that case is predicated on a rule with deep roots in
the Supreme Court's sovereign immunity jurisprudence: a waiver of sovereignimmunity is not valid if it is not voluntary.' 4 College Savings provides the impetus for
careful consideration of this principle-what I will call "the voluntariness
principle"--to assess how it manifests itself in waiver doctrine and to determine
whether it is consistently applied.
This article will focus on the role of the voluntariness principle with respect to a
subset of constructive waiver cases involving "waiver-in-litigation." Waiver-in-
litigation occurs when a waiver of sovereign immunity is implied from the conduct of
a state official during litigation; that is, it occurs when individuals who represent the
state in the courtroom take action deemed inconsistent with the retention of sovereign
immunity. This paper will demonstrate that, due to the unique dynamics of the
voluntariness principle in this context, the waiver-in-litigation cases represent an
7 See, e.g., Parden v. Terminal Ry. of the Ala. St. Docks Dep't, 377 U.S. 184, 192 (1964)
(holding that Congress could condition Alabama's operation of railroads in interstate commerce on
waiver of sovereign immunity).
8 Cf South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 211-12 (1987) (holding that Congress could
condition a grant of federal funds on states' passage of minimum drinking age laws).
9 527 U.S. 666 (1999).
'
0 Id. at 687.
" See id. at 691.
12 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (Supp. IV 1998). The Trademark Remedy Clarification Act amended
the Lanham Act and made clear that states were subject to suit for violations. 15 U.S.C. § 1122
(1994).
3 Coll. Say. Bank, 527 U.S. at 683.
14 See id. at 686-87.
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exception to the Supreme Court's prohibition against constructive waiver. I will
argue, moreover, that this exception should be construed even more broadly than
existing case law allows.
In particular, I will examine the Supreme Court's holding, in Ford Motor
Company v. Department of Treasury of Indiana,15 that a state-defendant does not
constructively waive sovereign immunity by litigating on the merits in trial court;
rather, a state may litigate on the merits at the trial level, perhaps lose, and then
retroactively revoke the jurisdiction of the federal courts by raising an Eleventh
Amendment claim on appeal. I will argue that this holding is not compelled by the
Supreme Court's Eleventh Amendment jurisprudence, the voluntariness principle, or
any other principle of constitutional law. Thus, the purpose of this paper is twofold: It
seeks to offer a comprehensive picture of the waiver-in-litigation case law, and it
raises criticisms of one strand of the doctrine that cannot be reconciled with the
general principles articulated in the cases.
Part II demonstrates that the voluntariness principle has long served as one of the
central themes of the Supreme Court's waiver jurisprudence. Part I.A introduces the
seminal constructive waiver cases. In some of these, it is made explicit that the
voluntariness principle is the driving force behind the decisions, while in others, the
voluntariness requirement is an unspoken premise of the Court's reasoning. Part lI.B
focuses on waiver-in-litigation. It reveals that the voluntariness principle underlies this
subset of constructive waiver cases as well, but that, on the whole, waivers obtained
in this fashion do not violate this fundamental rule. Part fl.C introduces FordMotor
Company-the doctrinal anomaly that will occupy our attention for the remainder of
the article.
Part TI is dedicated to the problems raised by Ford Motor Company. Part lII.A
describes circumstances in which, relying on the Ford rule, states raise the immunity
defense for the first time on appeal-thereby "revoking" the jurisdiction of the trial
court in order to evade the consequences of losing on the merits-and cases (from the
few years in between Seminole Tribe and Alden) in which states remove to federal
court only to seek dismissal on Eleventh Amendment grounds. With respect to these
cases, the Supreme Court's jurisprudence is one of "nonwaiver-in-litigation," i.e.,
these are situations in which state conduct during litigation that might be expected to
trigger a waiver of Eleventh Amendment protection (because it seems tantamount to
voluntary submission to federal jurisdiction) in fact fails to do so. Part Ul.B considers
criticisms of these quirks of federal jurisdiction. This section raises the possibility of
establishing a more robust (and, indeed, more coherent) waiver-in-litigation
jurisprudence in order to eliminate these quirks.
Part IV makes the case for overturning Ford Motor Company. Employing the
doctrines described in Part H and the vision of the voluntariness principle they reflect,
it argues that the waiver-in-litigation exception should encompass the Ford scenario.
" 323 U.S. 459 (1945).
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This Part demonstrates that neither the justification proffered by the Ford Court nor
the voluntariness principle can support that Court's adoption of a rule of nonwaiver
when states fail to raise the immunity defense at the trial level. I conclude by
suggesting two possible frameworks for conditioning states' right to litigate on the
merits in federal court on waiver of Eleventh Amendment immunity.
11. DOCTRINAL Roms
In a variety of different contexts, the Supreme Court has affirmed and reaffirmed
the notion that a waiver of Eleventh Amendment immunity is not valid if it is not
voluntary. This Part offers a survey of the Supreme Court's constructive waiver
jurisprudence and, in the process, seeks to illuminate the central (though not always
explicit) role played by the voluntariness principle in the doctrine. It then explores
how this principle has been applied in the waiver-in-litigation cases.
A. Statutory Constructive Waiver-The Basics
1. The Paradigm Cases: Regulated Activities and Federal Benefits
The term "constructive waiver" is most often used to describe waivers triggered
by state activity outside of the courtroom. Parden v. Terminal Railway of the
Alabama State Docks Department6 served as the foundation for constructive waiver
jurisprudence for thirty-five years. In that case, employees of a state-run railroad sued
the state agency charged with the railroad's operation for injuries sustained over the
course of their employment.17 The employees brought this suit in federal court under
the Federal Employers' Liability Act (FELA).' 8 The State claimed immunity under
the Eleventh Amendment and moved for dismissal. 9 The Court rejected this claim,
holding that Alabama waived its immunity by opting to engage in activity regulated
by the FELA.20 The FELA conditioned "the right to operate a railroad in interstate
16 377 U.S. 184 (1964).
17 Seeid. at 184.8 The employees alleged that as a "common carrier by railroad... engaging in commerce
between any of the several States," the railway fell within the terms of the Federal Employers'
Liability Act. Id. (quoting 45 U.S.C. §§ 51-60 (1958)).
19 See id. at 185. The Eleventh Amendment reads: "The Judicial power of the United States
shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one
of the United States by Citizens of another State or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State."
U.S. CONST. amend. XI.20 See Parden, 377 U.S. at 192. The Court explained:
It remains the law that a state may not be sued by an individual without its consent. Our
conclusion is simply that Alabama, when it began operation of an interstate railroad
approximately 20 years after the enactment of the FELA, necessarily consented to such suit as
was authorized by that Act.
20021
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commerce upon amenability to suit in federal court,"2' and, the Court held, "the state,
by [choosing to operate a railroad] voluntarily[,] submitted itself to [federal
jurisdiction]. 22
The Parden Court contributed a general rule of constructive waiver to sovereign
immunity doctrine: "[W]hen a state ... enters into activities subject to congressional
regulation, it subjects itself to that regulation as fully as if it were a private person or
corporation." 23 Under this rule, states cannot escape the jurisdiction-conferring
consequences of their actions by hiding behind the sovereign immunity shield.
2 4
This rule was repudiated by the Supreme Court in College Savings Bank v.
Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Education Expense Board.25 The defect in the
Parden holding, the College Savings Court found, was its failure to distinguish
properly voluntary from involuntary waiver. Writing for the majority, Justice Scalia
argued that "where the constitutionally guaranteed protection of the States' sovereign
immunity is involved, the point of coercion is automatically passed-and the
voluntariness of waiver destroyed-when what is attached to the refusal to waive is
the exclusion of the State from otherwise lawful activity. 26 Justice Scalia argued that
Parden-style waivers were functionally indistinguishable from the abrogation found
impermissible in Seminole Tribe.
2 7
The Court determined that the method of inducing waivers employed in the
Id.
211d.
22Id. at 191 n.ll.
231d. at 196.
24 One of the things that makes the majority opinion in Parden somewhat confusing is that the
Court seems concurrently to rely on theories of abrogation and constructive waiver. Before turning
to constructive waiver, Justice Brennan, writing for the majority, explained that "the States
surrendered a portion of their sovereignty when they granted Congress the power to regulate
commerce." He reasoned that "it must follow that application of the [FELA] to [a state-operated]
railroad cannot be precluded by sovereign immunity." Parden v. Terminal Ry. of the Ala. St. Docks
Dep't, 377 U.S. 184, 191-92 (1964). If Parden were purely a waiver case, this discussion of how
Congress could affirmatively strip a state of its constitutionally-protected immunity would have
been unnecessary. Put otherwise, Justice Brennan's opinion seems to identify consent to suit
twice-first, via ratification of the Constitution and the grant of Congress's Article I powers, and
second, as a function of the state's decision to engage in activity regulated under the FELA; as a
logical matter, it would seem that once would suffice. No immunity-stripping rationale would be
needed if the notion that the state impliedly consented to federal jurisdiction by engaging in the
regulated activity was sufficient to dispose of a claim of Eleventh Amendment immunity. Justice
Brennan alludes to the fact that these two issues are somewhat conflated in this opinion, but does
not directly confront the question of whether both discussions are necessary to the holding. See id.
at 193 n. 11.25 See Coll. Sav. Bank v. Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd., 527 U.S. 666, 683
(1999).26 Id. at 687.27 See id. at 683 ("Forced waiver and abrogation are not even different sides of the same
coin-they are the same side of the same coin.").
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Parden scenario imposed too great a cost on the states and thereby threatened the
voluntariness of their conduct. Although as a formal matter, states choose to engage
in regulated activities, the option of refraining from these activities was deemed by the
Court to be illusory. As a result, the decision to forego immunity in exchange for the
benefit of continuing such activities was, for constitutional purposes, determined to be
coerced. Because the Parden rule failed to preserve meaningful choice for states
wishing to engage in federally-regulated activity, it was not the proper tool for
identifying constitutionally effective waivers of immunity.
College Savings places tremendous emphasis on the link between voluntariness
and permissible waiver. The word "voluntary" (or some derivative of it) appears
eleven times over the course of the majority opinion. Justice Scalia begins his
discussion of constructive waiver by noting that "[t]he decision to
waive... immunity... 'is altogether voluntary on the part of the sovereignty."' 28
Later in the opinion, Justice Scalia rejects an argument set forth by the government
(the United States had intervened on behalf of College Savings Bank)29 by noting that
it had "no bearing upon the voluntariness of the waiver," thus reinforcing the notion
that voluntariness is the sine qua non of an effective waiver.3°
The exceptions recognized by the College Savings majority to the rule against
constructive waiver confirm the vitality of the voluntariness principle. Justice Scalia
distinguished two cases, Petty v. Tennessee-Missouri Bridge Commission31 and South
Dakota v. Dole,32 from College Savings, explaining that those cases involved
circumstances in which the federal government could induce waivers of immunity
without violating the voluntariness principle. In Petty, the Court held that Congress
could condition approval of an interstate compact on the states' willingness to waive
their immunity from suit.33 In Dole, the Court held that Congress could condition a
grant of federal funds on a state's willingness to undertake actions that Congress
could not affirmatively require it to perform.34 Justice Scalia explained that when
Congress consents to an interstate compact, "the granting of such consent is a
gratuity, ''35 and when Congress disburses funds in the exercise of its spending power,
"such funds are gifts."' 36 Because, in the Court's view, Petty and Dole involved "gifts
or gratuities" rather than the "otherwise lawful activity" at stake in College Savings,
28 Id. at 675 (quoting Beers v. Arkansas, 61 U.S. (20 How.) 527, 529 (1858)).
29 Id. at 671.
30 Id. at 684.
" 359 U.S. 275 (1959).
32 483 U.S. 203 (1987).
33 See Petty, 359 U.S. at 281-82 ("'The States who are parties to the compact by accepting it
and acting under it assume the conditions that Congress under the Constitution attached.").
14 See Dole, 483 U.S. at 207 ("[O]bjectives not thought to be within Article I's 'enumerated
legislative fields,' may nevertheless be attained through the use of the spending power and the
conditional grant of federal funds.").
31 Coll. Sav. Bank, 527 U.S. at 686.
36 Id. at 686-87.
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states might reasonably be expected voluntarily to forego these gifts in order to retain
their immunity from suit.37 As a result, waivers elicited in this fashion were deemed
not to violate College Savings's prohibition against coerced constructive waiver.
The shift in doctrine from Parden to College Savings brought the voluntariness
principle front and center-though it was by no means submerged in the prior case
law on constructive waiver. It is apparent from the trajectory of these cases that the
validity of any constructive waiver scheme will depend on whether the privilege or
benefit conditioned on waiver of immunity is one that the states might realistically be
expected to forego. Participation in otherwise lawful activity, apparently, is not such a
37 See id. Some commentators have responded to College Savings by suggesting that
Congress turn to the spending power with greater frequency as a means of extracting waivers of
immunity from the states. See, e.g., The Supreme Court, 1998 Term-Leading Cases, 113 HARV.
L. REv. 213,222 ("The exception for gifts and gratuities provides Congress with a way to subject
the states to private suit even under statutes that do not survive College Savings. Congress could
reformulate at least some of these statutes so that they use federal spending to induce waiver."); see
also Kinports, supra note 6, at 822-27; Note, supra note 6, at 1774-75. The lower federal courts,
in a handful of cases, have already applied the spending clause exception identified by Justice
Scalia. See, e.g., Sandoval v. Hagan, 197 F.3d 484, 500 (11 th Cir. 1999) (holding that the Alabama
Department of Public Safety had waived sovereign immunity by voluntarily accepting federal
funds under Title VI of the Rehabilitation Act Amendments); Bradley v. Ark. Dep't of Educ., 189
F.3d 745,753 (8th Cir. 1999) (holding that "Arkansas waived its Eleventh Amendment immunity
with respect to IDEA claims when it chose to participate in the federal spending program created
by the IDEA"); Litman v. George Mason Univ., 186 F.3d 544, 555 (4th Cir. 1999) (holding that
"conditioning federal funds on an unambiguous waiver of a state's Eleventh Amendment
immunity is as permissible as a state's direct waiver of such immunity"); Clark v. California, 123
F.3d 1267, 1271 (9th Cir. 1997) (holding that California waived Eleventh Amendment immunity
by accepting federal funds under the Rehabilitation Act); Huffine v. Cal. State Univ.-Chico (In re
Huffine), 246 B.R. 405, 411-12 (Bankr. E.D. Wash. 2000) (holding that California waived its
immunity from suit by accepting funds under Title IV of the Higher Education Act of 1965).
In the post-College Savings era, some circuits have also held that states constructively waive
their sovereign immunity when, under the Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub L. No. 104-104,
110 Stat. 56 (1996) (codified in scattered sections of Title 47 of the United States Code), they
exercise their authority to participate in a federal regulatory scheme, specifically, to act as
regulators of local telephone markets. Relying on the fact that Congress could have entrusted
regulation of the entire telecommunications industry to the federal government, these courts have
classified the offer of regulatory authority as a "gratuity," the permissible price of which is waiver
of immunity. See AT&T Comm. v. Bellsouth Telecomms., Inc., 238 F.3d 636,646 (5th Cir. 2001);
MCI Telecomms. Corp. v. Il. Bell Tel. Co., 222 F.3d 323, 343-44 (7th Cir. 2000); MCI
Telecomms. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n of Utah, 216 F.3d 929,938 (10th Cir. 2000). In 2001,
the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals held that states that choose to exercise their authority to
regulate the telecommunications industry under the 1996 Act do not waive their Eleventh
Amendment immunity. Bell AtI. Md., Inc. v. MCI Worldcom, Inc., 240 F.3d 279,292-93 (4th Cir.
2001). The court found the expression of Congress's intent to condition such state regulatory
action on waiver of immunity to be insufficiently clear to trigger waiver. Id. Thus, the decision in
Bell Atlantic Maryland does not speak to the question of whether the grant of such regulatory




2. The "Clear Statement" Cases
During the thirty-five years between Parden and College Savings, the Supreme
Court narrowed the constructive waiver rule substantially.38 It did so in an effort to
ensure that waivers of this sort met the voluntariness requirement. It is worth taking a
step backward, then, to examine the erosion ofParden's constructive waiver rule and
to assess how the doctrine changed as the Court sought better to assure that only
voluntarily offered waivers would be effective.
This process was accomplished primarily through the establishment of clear
statement rules. Under a clear statement rule, for Congress or a state to remove the
sovereign immunity obstacle via abrogation or waiver, its intention to do so must be
communicated with extreme clarity. In Pennhurst State School & Hospital v.
Haldernan,39 a resident of a state-operated facility for the care and treatment of the
mentally retarded sued the facility and various state officials, alleging that conditions
at the facility were unsanitary and inhumane. The complaint alleged, inter alia, that
the conditions at Pennhurst violated the Developmentally Disabled Assistance and
Bill of Rights Act.40 In the course of assessing the conditions imposed by the federal
government on states that chose to accept money under this Act, the Pennhurst I
Court explored the link between clear statement rules and the voluntariness principle:
Turning to Congress' power to legislate pursuant to the spending power, our cases
have long recognized that Congress may fix the terms on which it shall disburse
federal money to the states.... [L]egislation enacted pursuant to the spending power
is much in the nature of a contract: in return for federal funds, the States agree to
comply with federally imposed conditions. The legitimacy of Congress' power to
legislate under the spending power... rests on whether the State voluntarily and
knowingly accepts the terms of the "contract." There can, of course, be no knowing
acceptance if a State is unaware of the conditions or is unable to ascertain what is
expected of it. Accordingly, if Congress intends to impose a condition on the grant
of federal moneys, it must do so unambiguously. By insisting that Congress speak
with a clear voice, we enable the States to exercise their choice knowingly,
cognizant of the consequences of their participation.'
38 See Coll. Say. Bank, 527 U.S. at 680 (noting that the Court "ha[s] never applied the holding
of Parden to another statute, and in fact ha[s] narrowed the case in every subsequent opinion in
which it has been under consideration").
39 451 U.S. 1 (1981) [hereinafter Pennhurst I].40 Id. at 6; see 42 U.S.C. §§ 6000-6081 (1976).
41 Pennhurst I, 451 U.S. at 17 (citing Employees of the Dep't of Health & Welfare of Mo. v.
Dep't of Health & Welfare of Mo., 411 U.S. 279, 285 (1973); Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651
(1974)).
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This excerpt characterizes the clear statement rule as a tool used by the courts to
preserve voluntary choice for the states.42 As this section will demonstrate, a rule
requiring that any conditions imposed by the federal government be made explicit-
conditions attached either to state participation in regulated activity (in the pre-
College Savings era) or to states' acceptance of federal funds (a practice not
invalidated by College Savings)-assures that states are perfectly aware of the
consequences of their conduct. Likewise, when a state's desire to waive immunity is
communicated through a state statute, a clear statement of such desire signals to the
courts that the state perceives the costs of its choice. In short, with clear statement
rules in place, the risk of involuntary waiver decreases.
In Employees of the Department of Public Health and Welfare of Missouri v.
Department ofPublic Health and Welfare ofMissouri,43 for example, the Court held
that employees of a state health facility could not sue the State of Missouri in federal
court for violations of the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA).44 Congress had amended
the FLSA in 1966, explicitly bringing employees of state hospitals, institutions, and
schools under the ambit of the Act.41 Still, the Parden rule, under which Missouri
would have waived its immunity by choosing to operate hospitals, was not applied,
and the suit was dismissed.46
Parden was distinguished on two grounds. First, the Court explained that the
regulated activity in Parden was for profit while the activity in Missouri Employees
was not.47 Because the State in Parden was acting within a sphere normally occupied
by private individuals and corporations, it made sense to treat the State like a private
party for jurisdictional purposes. The same could not be said with respect to Missouri
Employees. Second, the Court emphasized that Congress did not indicate clearly in
the FLSA an intent to subject states to suit in federal court.48 The Court held that the
1966 amendments did expose states to suit but only in state courts.49 The majority
refused to "infer that Congress deprived Missouri of her constitutional immunity
without... indicating in some way by clear language that the constitutional immunity
was swept away."
50
42 See William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, Quasi-Constitutional Law: Clear
Statement Rules as Constitutional Lawmaking, 45 VAND. L. REv. 593,619-23 (1992) (presenting
justifications for clear statement rules in the sovereign immunity context and citing Pennhurst 1).
43 411 U.S. 279 (1973) [hereinafter Missouri Employees].
44 Id. at 285.
45 29 U.S.C. § 203(d) (Supp. 1970); Missouri Employees, 411 U.S. at 282-83.46Missouri Employees, 411 U.S. at 285.47 Id. at 284.
481 Id. at 285.491 Id. at 287.
50 d. at 285; see also id. at 284-85 ("[Wlhen Congress does act, it may place new or even
enormous fiscal burdens on the States. Congress, acting responsibly, would not be presumed to
take such action silently."); id. at 285 ("It is not easy to infer that Congress ... desired silently to
deprive the States of an immunity they have long enjoyed under.., the Constitution.").
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One year after Missouri Employees, the Court had occasion to apply and refine
the clear statement rule. In Edelman v. Jordan,5 1 recipients of federal-state Aid to the
Aged, Blind, or Disabled (AABD) sued Illinois officials for failure to administer
benefits in accordance with federal regulations.52 The Seventh Circuit, relying on
Parden, held that Illinois had waived its immunity by participating in the AABD
program.53 The Supreme Court reversed.54 "In deciding whether a State has waived
its constitutional protection under the Eleventh Amendment, we will find waiver only
where stated 'by the most express language or by such overwhelming implications
from the text as [will] leave no room for any other reasonable construction.' " Mere
participation by a state in a federal-state public aid program was deemed insufficient
to establish waiver.
56
Similarly, in Atascadero State Hospital v. Scanlon,5 7 respondent brought suit
against a state hospital, alleging discriminatory failure to hire in violation of the
Rehabilitation Act. 8 The State claimed Eleventh Amendment immunity and moved
to dismiss.59 Scanlon responded with three arguments.60 First, he argued that
California had waived its immunity in a provision of its constitution.6' Second, he
contended that Congress had abrogated state sovereign immunity by passing the
Rehabilitation Act.6" Third, he maintained that California had consented to suit in
federal court by accepting federal funds under the Rehabilitation Act.63
In rejecting each of these arguments, the Court presented three variations on the
clear statement theme. First, the Court noted that the waiver of immunity contained in
article III, section 5 of the California Constitution was general-it did not specify the
State's willingness to be sued in federal court. 64 The Court explained that, as in
Missouri Employees, "[i]n the absence of an unequivocal waiver specifically
applicable to federal-court jurisdiction, we decline to find that California has waived
its constitutional immunity."65 Second, the Court dismissed respondent's contention
415 U.S. 651 (1974).
52See id. at 653-56.
53 See Jordan v. Weaver, 472 F.2d 985, 995 (7th Cir. 1973).54 Edelman, 415 U.S. at 678.
5' Id. at 673 (quoting Murray v. Wilson Distilling Co., 213 U.S. 151, 171 (1909) (alteration in
original)).
56 Id.
57 473 U.S. 234 (1985).
5" Id. at 236.




64 See id. at 241. The relevant provision of the California Constitution reads: "Suits maybe
brought against the state in such manner and in such courts as shall be directed by law." CAL.
CONST. art. III, § 5.65 Atascadero State Hosp., 473 U.S. at 241 (citing Missouri Employees, 411 U.S. 279,285-
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that the Rehabilitation Act abrogated state sovereign immunity.66 Relying on its
holdings in Pennhurst State School and Hospital v. Halderman67 and Quern v.
Jordan,6' the Court restated the requirement that "Congress unequivocally express its
intention to abrogate the Eleventh Amendment bar to suits against the States in
federal court."69 For Congress to abrogate state sovereign immunity, it would have to
do so in "unmistakably clear" language, 70 and the Rehabilitation Act failed to meet
this high standard of clarity.71 Last, the Court turned to the implied waiver question
and held that "the mere receipt of federal funds cannot establish that a State has
consented to suit in federal court.",72 The Court explained that when waivers of
immunity are extracted by attaching conditions to grants offered under the spending
power, Congress must "manifest a clear intent to condition participation in the
programs funded under the Act on a State's consent to waive its constitutional
immunity."
73
Two years later, the Supreme Court decided Welch v. Texas Department of
Highways and Public Transportation.74 In that case, an individual attempted to sue
the State of Texas under section 33 of the Jones Act for injuries sustained while in the
employ of the Texas Highway Department.75 Welch claimed that Congress had
abrogated state sovereign immunity with respect to such suits, but the Court rejected
petitioner's claim and dismissed the suit for lack ofjurisdiction.76 The Court held that
"to the extent that Parden v. Terminal Railway is inconsistent with the requirement
that an abrogation of Eleventh Amendment immunity by Congress must be expressed
in unmistakably clear language, it is overruled.,
77
The majority opinion in Welch blurs the line separating abrogation and
constructive waiver. It partially repudiates Parden, the seminal constructive waiver
case, in the context of a discussion about abrogation. It is difficult to determine,
therefore, whether the holding sheds light on the limits of Congress's power either to
abrogate state sovereign immunity or to condition participation in federally-regulated
87 (1973)); see supra notes 48-50 and accompanying text.66 Atascadero, 473 U.S. at 242.
67 465 U.S. 89 (1984) [hereinafter Pennhurst II].
61 440 U.S. 332 (1979).69 Atascadero State Hosp., 473 U.S. at 242 (citing Pennhurst II, 465 U.S. at 99; Quern, 440
U.S. at 342-45).
70 id.
71 Id. at 246.
72 d. at 246-47. Here, the Court calls to mind the Edelman holding. See supra text
accompanying notes 55-56.731 Id. at 247.
74 483 U.S. 468 (1987).
75 Id. at 471. Section 33 of the Jones Act permitted any seaman who suffered an injuryin the
course of employment to sue for damages in federal court. 46 U.S.C. app. § 688(a) (1986).
76 Welch, 483 U.S. at 495.
77 Id. at 478.
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activities on waiver.78 Still, if it was not clear after Edelman and Atascadero, there
could be no mistake any longer: For Congress to put the pieces in place for a binding
constructive waiver, it would have to do so expressly and unambiguously.
Surprisingly, while the Court has had many opportunities to apply and modify the
clear statement rule in the sovereign immunity context, only Pennhurst I pays
significant attention to its justification. In Missouri Employees, the Court intimated
that it would not be "responsibl[e]" for Congress to elicit a waiver of sovereign
immunity without doing so explicitly but did not explain why.79 The Edelman Court
noted that "[c]onstructive consent is not a doctrine commonly associated with the
surrender of constitutional rights, 80 but failed to articulate why this is so or to identify
harmful consequences that would result from permissive standards regarding implied
waiver of immunity.8' The Atascadero Court offered multiple applications of the
clear statement rule but presented no justification for it. 82 Perhaps the purpose served
by the rule seemed so obvious as to render it unnecessary to state the justification
explicitly.
In any event, there can be no doubt that the voluntariness principle fueled the
development of this body of Eleventh Amendment doctrine and underlies the sea
change embodied in College Savings. The Court's scrupulous attention to the clarity
with which Congress might seek to abrogate, or a state might seek to waive, sovereign
immunity is best understood as an effort to protect the states from unknowing waivers
of immunity. 3
78 As noted above, the difficulty of keeping the concepts of abrogation and constructive
waiver analytically distinct was acknowledged by Justice Scalia in College Savings. Coll. Sav.
Bank v. Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd., 527 U.S. 666,683 (1999) ("Forced waiver
and abrogation are not even different sides of the same coin-they are the same side of the same
coin."); Kinports, supra note 6, at 807-09.
79 See Missouri Employees, 411 U.S. 279, 284-85 (1973).80 Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651,673 (1974).
81 id.
12 See Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234, 241-47 (1985).
83 Professors Eskridge and Frickey note that clear statement rules are also often used as a
means of assuring careful legislative deliberation. These rules "are a practical way for the Court to
focus legislative attention on [preferred] values." Eskridge and Frickey, supra note 42, at 597. At
least one commentator has suggested that this is the primary function played by clear statement
rules in the sovereign immunity context. Lauren Ouziel, Waiving States 'Sovereign Immunityfrom
Suit in Their Own Courts: Purchased Waiver and the Clear Statement Rule, 99 COLuM. L. REv.
1584, 1598 (1999) ("The principal reason for the Court's requiring a clear statement is to ensure
that Congress has carefully deliberated before infringing on states' autonomy."). In their discussion
of clear statement rules and sovereign immunity, however, Professors Eskridge and Frickey focus
on the role played by clear statement rules in securing knowing and voluntary waiverrather than on
the rules' propensity to trigger legislative deliberation. See Eskridge and Frickey, supra note 42, at
620 (citing Pennhurst I, 451 U.S. 1, 25 (1981) for "the proposition that 'the crucial inquiry
[is] ... whether Congress spoke so clearly that we can fairly say that the State could make an
informed choice."').
2002]
OHIO STATE LA W JOURNAL
Little is left of the constructive waiver doctrine. The Supreme Court has rejected
the notion that states might voluntarily forego participation in otherwise lawful
regulated activity and, as a corollary, it has dramatically reduced the class of cases in
which the federal govemment may extract waivers of immunity from the states.
However, a set of waiver cases has survived College Savings's contraction of the
implied waiver possibilities: the waiver-in-litigation cases. In contrast to waivers
inferred from state participation in primary conduct regulated by statute, these
waivers, implied as a result of the conduct of state representatives in the courtroom,
have been deemed by the Supreme Court to meet the voluntariness requirement.
B. Waiver-in-Litigation
This section focuses on circumstances in which the behavior of state actors
during the course of litigation has been deemed inconsistent with the retention of
sovereign immunity. Hardly abandoning the voluntariness requirement, these cases
reflect careful attention to whether the waiver in question can be construed as having
been voluntarily offered. This body of case law, together with the Parden line of
cases, fills out the picture of what the voluntariness requirement entails. It suggests,
without clarifying explicitly, the existence of a significant categorical distinction
between the sort of waivers at issue in the "ordinary" constructive waiver cases
(discussed above) and waiver-in-litigation.
1. State as Intervenor
Clark v. Barnard,84 decided in 1883, is the grandparent of constructive waiver
doctrine. In Clark, the Supreme Court was confronted with a dispute over funds
fraudulently signed over to the State of Rhode Island by the directors of the Boston,
Hartford & Erie Railroad Company.85 After the railroad went bankrupt, assignees of
the estate sued to enjoin the State of Rhode Island from collecting these funds.8 6 The
State filed a demurrer arguing that the Eleventh Amendment prohibited the federal
courts from exercising jurisdiction over the suit. 87 In addition, the State intervened as
14 108 U.S. 436 (1883). This case is usually cited as support for the proposition that sovereign
immunity is waivable. See, e.g., Coll. Sav. Bank v. Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd.,
527 U.S. 666, 670 (1999); JOHN V. ORTH, THE JUDICIAL POWER OF THE UNrED STATES 124
(1987); Fletcher, supra note 2, at 1092 & n.232 (1983). For purposes of this article, however, the
significance of this case lies not only in that it established the possibility of waiver, but also in the
link the Court established between permissible waiver and voluntariness.
85 Te complainants argued that the directors of the corporation had acted without proper
authority and that the transaction was therefore void. Clark, 108 U.S. at 444.
86 Id.
8 Id. at 445.
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a claimant to the estate, pressing its right to the funds in controversy. 88
The Court rejected the State's Eleventh Amendment claim, holding that Rhode
Island had waived its immunity by intervening to stake its claim to the fund. The
Court explained that "[t]he immunity from suit belonging to a State... is a personal
privilege which it may waive at pleasure,"" and it held that "the voluntary appearance
of the State in intervening as a claimant of the fund" effectuated a waiver of
immunity.90 The Court emphasized that when the State opted to intervene as a
claimant, "[i]t became an actor as well as defendant."9' The actor/defendant
distinction was crucial to the Court's reasoning. The State's decision to act voluntarily
by employing the federal courts in an effort to claim funds triggered the waiver; had
the State been content to remain a simple defendant, it is likely that the protection of
the Eleventh Amendment would have been available. 9' -
The second pillar of the Court's early constructive waiver jurisprudence is
Gunter v. Atlantic Coast Line Railroad Company,93 a case decided in 1906. In
Gunter, South Carolina challenged Atlantic's claim to an exemption from state
taxes.94 This exemption had been challenged in the federal courts in 1873. At that
time, the Supreme Court, in Humphrey v. Pegues,95 upheld the exemption and
enjoined the State from taxing the railroad. 96 In 1900, when the State tried to tax the
railroad again, Atlantic, as successor to the rights of Pegues, sought the protection of
the Court's injunction.97 The Gunter Court was required to determine whether South
Carolina had waived its immunity from suit in the prior (1873) litigation; if it had not,
that judgment would be unenforceable because the federal courts would have lacked
jurisdiction. The Court explained:
8 Id. at 445-46.
89 1d. at 447.
90 Id. at 447-48.
9' Id. at 448.
92 Federal courts applying Clark have stressed that the holding in that case rested squarelyon
the voluntariness of the state's waiver-inducing conduct. See, e.g., Wis. Dep't ofCorr. v. Schacht,
524 U.S. 381,395 (1998) (Kennedy, J., concurring) (citing Clark forthe proposition that "a State's
voluntary intervention in a federal-court action to assert its own claim constitute[s] a waiver of the
Eleventh Amendment"); Sutton v. Utah State Sch. for the Deaf and Blind, 173 F.3d 1226, 1236
(10th Cir. 1999) (citing Clark and noting that "where a State voluntarily becomes a party to a cause
and submits its rights for judicial determination, it will be bound thereby and cannot escape the
result of its own voluntary act by invoking the prohibitions of the Eleventh Amendment");
Woelffer v. Happy States of America, Inc., 626 F. Supp. 499,502 (N.D. fI 1985) (explaining that,
in Clark, "the State of Rhode Island voluntarily appeared in a federal interpleader
action ... [thereby] voluntarily submitting to the federal court's jurisdiction").
9' 200 U.S. 273 (1906).
94 Id. at 273.
95 3 U.S. (16 Wall.) 244 (1873).
96 Gunter, 200 U.S. at 278-79.97 Id. at 280-81.
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Although a State may not be sued without its consent, such immunity is a privilege
which may be waived, and hence where a State voluntarily becomes a party to a
cause and submits its rights for judicial determination, it will be bound thereby and
cannot escape the result of its own voluntary act by invoking the prohibitions of the
Eleventh Amendment.9"
The Court then held that South Carolina had, in fact, voluntarily submitted to the
jurisdiction of the federal courts in Pegues by substituting itself as the "real
defendant" in a suit that had initially been brought against state taxing officials and
not against the state itself.99 The jurisdiction of the Pegues Court having been upheld,
the Court went on to vindicate Atlantic's claim.'00
The emphasis on voluntariness in Gunter's Eleventh Amendment holding is
unmistakable. Together with Clark, it establishes that a waiver of immunity may, in
some circumstances, be inferred from state conduct during litigation, so long as that
conduct is voluntary. Crucially, notwithstanding the obvious cost to states of retaining
their immunity in these cases-loss of the right to intervene in lawsuits so as to
protect certain legal entitlements-the Court did not construe the decision to forego
immunity as having been coerced.
2. When States Initiate Legal Action
a. Claims in Bankruptcy Proceedings
Waiver-in-litigation questions frequently arise in the bankruptcy context. When a
state files a proof of claim in bankruptcy court, the trustee of the estate might want to
challenge it and litigate over the underlying substantive issues. To be sure, the trustee
could not affirmatively sue the state to recover on the underlying claim without the
state's consent-sovereign immunity would shield the state from suit. Yet, in these
cases, the state voluntarily submits to the jurisdiction of the bankruptcy court by filing
its proof of claim. What is the scope of the submission to the bankruptcy court's
jurisdiction? When a state accedes to the jurisdiction of a bankruptcy court for the
narrow purpose of having that court decide the priority of its claim relative to those of
other creditors, does it confer upon that court jurisdiction to adjudicate the substantive
merit of the claim itself? How broad is the waiver?
The Supreme Court answered these questions in Gardner v. New Jersey.10 1 That
case involved the Central Railroad Company of New Jersey, which had filed for
bankruptcy in 1939. 102 The State of New Jersey, acting through its comptroller, filed a
9
' Id. at 284 (citing Clark, 108 U.S. at 447).
99 Id. at 284-87 (citing 14 S.C. Stat. 65, the state law provisions that effectivelytransformed
such suits against officials into suits against the state).
'0o Id. at 293.
10' 329 U.S. 565 (1947).
1o Id. at 568.
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claim for roughly $20 million in unpaid taxes and interest. 10 3 Gardner, as trustee of
the bankrupt estate, filed an objection to the State's claim, asserting that New Jersey's
rights to the estate were governed by a settlement agreement that had been accepted
by the state legislature. 104 The trustee filed a petition to have the State's claims
adjudicated, and the Attorney General of New Jersey responded by invoking
sovereign immunity.105
The Supreme Court held that New Jersey had waived its sovereign immunity by
filing the proof of claim. "It is traditional bankruptcy law," the Court stated, 'that he
who invokes the aid of the bankruptcy court by offering a proof of claim and
demanding its allowance must abide by the consequences of that procedure."' 6 The
Court offered three reasons for its conclusion. Writing for the Court, Justice Douglas
first noted that if the bankruptcy court were permitted to adjudicate objections to
claims made by all creditors with the exception of state-creditors, "unmeritorious or
excessive claims [brought by a state] might dilute the participation of legitimate
claimants."'0 7 For this reason, it would be unfair to subject claims made by states to
lesser scrutiny than that applied to all other claims. Second, the Court noted that the
jurisdiction of a bankruptcy court is jurisdiction in rem, encompassing the estate as a
unit. When a state submits to a court's jurisdiction by making a claim to the res, that
court's jurisdiction over the estate extends to multiple ways of disposing of claims
made on it, not merely to prioritizing them.10 8 Finally, the Court cited Clark and
Gunter and turned to the voluntariness principle. "When the State becomes the actor
and files a claim against the fund, it waives any immunity which it otherwise might
have had respecting the adjudication of the claim."' 09
The last of these justifications for the Court's decision has emerged as critical. In
fact, the Supreme Court's discussion of Gardner in the College Savings decision
focuses exclusively on the voluntariness principle. The Court indicated that
"Gardner... stands for the.., proposition that a state waives its sovereign immunity
1o3 Id. at 570.
'04 1 d. Gardner also claimed that the tax assessments against the estate were too high because
New Jersey overvalued the debtor's property. Id. Further, he argued that the debtor had been
intentionally discriminated against in the assessment of taxes, and he objected to the state's claim
for interest on the unpaid taxes. Id.
'
5 Id. at 571.
106 Id. at 573 (citations omitted).
'07 Gardner, 329 U.S. at 573.
18 Id. at 574 ("The whole process of proof [is] an adjudication of interests claimed in a res. It
is none the less such because the claim is rejected in toto, reduced in part, given a priority inferior
to that claimed, or satisfied in some way other than payment in cash."); cf Fla. Dep't of State v.
Treasure Salvors, Inc., 458 U.S. 670,700 (1982) (noting that, when exercising in rem jurisdiction
in the admiralty context, adjudicating the rights of a state in full "would be justified if the State
voluntarily advanced a claim to the [res]").
'09 Gardner, 329 U.S. at 574 (emphasis added).
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by voluntarily invoking the jurisdiction of the federal courts."' 10 Similarly, the lower
federal courts, in applying and refining the Gardner rule, have repeatedly emphasized
that it is the voluntary nature of a state's action that secures the legality of the
waiver.' 11
b. Counterclaims Against State Plaintiffs
Similar questions regarding the breadth of a state's waiver of immunity arise
when a litigant files a counterclaim against a sovereign plaintiff. When a state
voluntarily submits to the jurisdiction of a federal court by filing suit, what are the
Eleventh Amendment implications?
Much of the case law on this subject has been developed in the area of federal
sovereign immunity. In two cases decided on the same day in 1940, United States v.
Shaw112 and United States v. United States Fidelity and Guaranty Company, 13 the
Supreme Court held that when the federal government files suit against a private
litigant, it exposes itself to counterclaims up to the amount of the government's
claim." 4 The lower federal courts have qualified this rule by explaining that the
"0 Coll. Sav. Bank v. Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd., 527 U.S. 666,681 n.3
(1999) (emphasis added).
" See, e.g., Dekalb County Division of Family and Children Serv. v. Platter (In re Platter),
140 F.3d 676, 679-80 (7th Cir. 1998):
Because a state voluntarily chooses to enter a bankruptcy case when it initiates an adversary
proceeding, we hold that a state removes itself from the Eleventh Amendment's protection by
starting one.... When a state chooses to avail itself of the bankruptcy court as a plaintiff, the
Eleventh Amendment does not apply and the state will receive the same treatment as other
parties. The Eleventh Amendment does not prevent a state from entering a federal forum
voluntarily to pursue its own interest. However, if a state embarks down this route, it cannot
run back to seek Eleventh Amendment protection when it does not like the result.
(citations omitted); see also Rose v. United States Dep't of Educ. (In re Rose), 187 F.3d 926, 929
(8th Cir. 1999) (relying on College Savings for the proposition that, under Gardner, filing a proof
of claim in bankruptcy court qualifies as voluntary submission to federal jurisdiction); Sutton v.
Utah State Sch. for the Deaf and Blind, 173 F.3d 1226, 1234 (10th Cir. 1999) (explaining that a
"State waives Eleventh Amendment immunity by voluntarily appearing in bankruptcy court to file
a proof of claim"); Ga. Dep't of Revenue v. Burke (In re Burke), 146 F.3d 1313, 1318-19 (11 th
Cir. 1998) (same).
112 309 U.S. 495 (1940).
"' 309 U.S. 506 (1940).
"14 Shaw, 309 U.S. at 501; United States Fid. & Guar. Co., 309 U.S. at 511; Bull v. United
States, 295 U.S. 247, 262 (1935) (stating that:
No direct suit can be maintained against the United States; but when an action is brought by
the United States, to recover money in the hands of a party, who has a legal claim against




government's waiver of immunity is restricted to claims arising out of the transaction
upon which the government's suit is based."5 Put otherwise, the waiver extends to
"compulsory" but not "permissive" counterclaims." 16
The federal courts have applied this rule in the state sovereign immunity context
as well. In In re Monongahela Rye Liquors, Inc., 7 the Third Circuit held that "when
the United States or a State institutes a suit, it thereby submits itself to the jurisdiction
of the court, [and] draws in ... such adverse claims as have arisen out of the same
transaction which gave rise to the sovereign's suit."" 8 More recently, in Schlossberg
v. Maryland (In re Creative Goldsmiths of Washington D.C., Inc.),' the Fourth
Circuit spelled out the reasoning behind this application of the constructive waiver
rule:
[I]t would violate the fundamental fairness of judicial process to allow a state to
proceed in federal court and at the same time strip the defendant of valid defenses
because they might be construed to be affirmative claims against the state. When a
state authorizes its officials voluntarily to invoke federal process in a federal forum,
the state thereby consents to the federal forum's rules of procedure .... For this
reason, we hold that to the extent a defendant's assertions in a state-instituted federal
action... amount to a compulsory counterclaim, a state has waived any Eleventh
Amendment immunity against that counterclaim in order to avail itself of the federal
forum'
120
(quoting United States v. Ringgold, 33 U.S. (8 Pet.) 150, 163 (1834))).
115 See, e.g., Federal Say. & Loan Ins. Corp. v. Quinn, 419 F.2d 1014, 1017 (7th Cir. 1969)
("[W]aiver of immunity is limited to matters in recoupment arising out of the same transaction or
occurrence which is the subject matter of the suit, to the extent of defeating the plaintiffs claim.");
Frederick v. United States, 386 F.2d 481, 488 (5th Cir. 1967); United States v. Kennedy (In re
Greenstreet, Inc.), 209 F.2d 660,663 (7th Cir. 1954); United States v. Kallen (In re Oxford Mktg.,
Ltd.), 444 F. Supp. 399, 403 (N.D. fI1. 1978); see also 6 CHARLES A. WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 1427 (2d ed. 1990) ("[W]hen the United States institutes an action,
[the] defendant may assert by way of recoupment any claim arising out of the same transaction or
occurrence as the original claim in order to reduce or defeat the government's recovery."); 3 JAMES
W. MOORE, MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE § 13.50[2][c] (3d ed. 1999).
116 FED. R. Crv. P. 13(a) ("A pleading shall state as a counterclaim anyclaim which at the time
of serving the pleading the pleader has against any opposing party, if it arises out of the transaction
or occurrence that is the subject matter of the opposing party's claim."); Quinn, 419 F.2d at 1017.
117 141 F.2d 864 (3d Cir. 1944).
l' Id. at 869 (emphasis added).
119 119 F.3d 1140 (4th Cir. 1997).
'
2 0 Id. at 1148; see also, e.g., Genentech, Inc. v. Eli Lilly& Co., 998 F.2d 931,946-47 (Fed.
Cir. 1993) (holding that, by filing suit, states waive their immunity against compulsory
counterclaims suitable for recoupment); Woelffer v. Happy States of Am., Inc., 626 F. Supp. 499,
502 (N.D. 111. 1985) (same); Ga. Dep't of Human Res. v. Bell, 528 F. Supp. 17, 26 (N.D. Ga.
1981) (same); Burgess v. M/V Tamano, 382 F. Supp. 351,355-56 & n.6 (D. Maine 1974) (same);
Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Neb. v. Dawes, 370 F. Supp. 1190, 1191 (D. Neb. 1974) (same);
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Like the bankruptcy cases, the counterclaim cases indicate that a sovereign's
decision voluntarily to submit to the jurisdiction of a federal court triggers at least a
partial waiver of immunity. While a sovereign entity retains the right to choose
whether to press its claim in a federal court, it cannot control the precise parameters of
the court's jurisdiction once it initiates proceedings.
The College Savings decision uprooted broad swaths of constructive waiver
doctrine, yet it seems to have left the waiver-in-litigation cases intact. Indeed, while
the majority explicitly overruled "whatever may remain of [the] decision in Parden,"
it did not intimate that any waiver-in-litigation cases had been disturbed.121 Thus,
when states engage in conduct in the courtroom that might reasonably be construed as
waiving immunity, it remains within the power of the federal courts to deem that
waiver has occurred. Indeed, as these cases have repeatedly confirmed, it is
permissible to infer waivers under these circumstances notwithstanding the lack of
any clear statement in a federal statute that undertaking these standard litigation
tactics will trigger waiver. Perhaps the notion that the fundamental fairness ofjudicial
process requires waiver in these circumstances is so obvious that no clear statement is
needed; there is no reason to state clearly what everyone knows already. Perhaps the
voluntariness of the State's conduct in these cases is so readily apparent that there is
no need to worry about whether states have explicitly been made aware of the
consequences of their agents' in-courtroom behavior. Whatever the reasons (and
these will be discussed in Part IV), waiver-in-litigation appears to represent a still
viable set of constructive waivers possibilities.
C. The Ford Motor Company Decision
The waiver-in-litigation exception outlined above is not applied consistently.
Some conduct undertaken by state agents in the courtroom that one would expect to
trigger a waiver of immunity in fact does not.
In Ford Motor Company v. Department of the Treasury ofIndiana,122 the Ford
Motor Company sued the State of Indiana for a tax refund.123 Ford had followed the
procedures dictated by Indiana law for securing such a refund, but to no avail.
1 24
After successfully defending on the merits before the district and circuit courts, the
Dep't of Transp. of the State of 111. v. Am. Commercial Lines, Inc., 350 F. Supp. 835, 837-38
(N.D. 11. 1972) (same).
121 Coll. Sav. Bank v. Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd., 527 U.S. 666, 680
(1999).
122 323 U.S. 459 (1945).
123 Id. at 460.
12 4 Id. at 461.
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State appeared before the United States Supreme Court and, for the first time, asserted
sovereign immunity as a defense and challenged the jurisdiction of the federal
courts. 25 In response, Ford contended that the State had waived its immunity through
the conduct of its Attorney General.126 Specifically, Ford argued that the Attorney
General's failure to assert immunity earlier in the proceedings constituted a waiver. 27
The Court explained, first, that the mere fact that Indiana had failed to raise the
Eleventh Amendment defense below did not prevent it from asserting immunity on
certiorari. "The Eleventh Amendment," the Court explained, "declares a policy and
sets forth an explicit limitation on federal judicial power of such compelling force that
this Court will consider the issue arising under this Amendment in this case even
though urged for the first time in this Court.' 28 The Court noted, however, that "[i]t
is conceded by the [State] that if it is within the power of the.., officers of Indiana to
waive the state's immunity, they have done so in this proceeding. " 29 The Court then
explained that a waiver could take hold only if the official was authorized, under state
law, to consent to suit on the State's behalf.
130
In determining whether state law authorized a particular official to waive
immunity, the federal courts were directed to look first to the decisions of the state
courts, and, if no holding directly on point existed, to "resort to the general policy of
the state as expressed in its Constitution, statutes and decisions.""'i' In Ford Motor
Company, the Supreme Court's analysis of Indiana law and policy revealed a strong
presumption against officials waiving Eleventh Amendment immunity.' 3 2 The Court
found that the general power bestowed on the Indiana Attorney General to litigate
claims on the merits did not, as a matter of state law, include the authority to waive
sovereign immunity. 133
2' Id. at 464.
126 Id. at 466-67.





132 Id. at 468 (citing IND. CONST. art. IV, § 24). The Court held that Indiana law did not allow
consent to suit on a case-by-case basis, but rather permitted waiver onlythrough the enactment of a
general statute by the state legislature. Id.
133 Id. It is difficult to understand why the Court felt it necessary to assert both that Eleventh
Amendment immunity isjurisdictional in nature, and could, therefore, be raised on appeal for the
first time and that a waiver could be effective only if the relevant state official was authorized to
forego the state's Eleventh Amendment protection. For if the "jurisdictional nature" of sovereign
immunity is sufficient to render (at least non-explicit) waiver impossible, then it is not clear why it
should matter whether the official who failed to raise an immunity claim was empowered under
state law to waive immunity. No such waiver could have occurred anyway--the defense could
never be waived by inaction. Similarly, if a state official were not empowered to waive immunity
on the state's behalf, then the question of whether an Eleventh Amendment defense could be
raised on appeal for the first time would seem moot. The prohibition against an unauthorized
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Under FordMotor Company, even if a state official is acting within the scope of
her authority and she engages in conduct that appears to submit the State to the
jurisdiction of the federal courts, there is no waiver unless the official is specifically
authorized by state law to consent to suit. Thus, while, as a threshold matter, federal
law might govern what conduct leads to a waiver of immunity, it cannot, of its own
force, determine whether there has been waiver through litigation in any particular
case.
The Ford holding has been applied both within and without the waiver-in-
litigation context. For example, many federal courts have been called upon to
determine whether a state attorney's decision to remove a case to federal court triggers
a waiver of immunity. 134 As one of these courts explained, "the appellate courts have
agreed with or rejected claims of waiver by looking to whether the state's law actually
authorized the attorney to waive sovereign immunity., 135 Under the Ford rule, even if
Congress or the federal courts determined that removal to federal court should trigger
a waiver of sovereign immunity, 136 such waivers would be effective only if authorized
by state law.
137
Similar issues have been addressed by the lower federal courts in conditional
spending cases. These cases raise the question of whether states waive their immunity
by accepting federal funds when Congress conditions the receipt of such funds on
official rendering a binding waiver on the state's behalf would, of necessity, entail the
permissibility of raising the defense for the first time on appeal.
134 The Supreme Court recently heard oral argument in Lapides v. Board of Regents of the
University of Georgia, 251 F.3d 1372 (11 th Cir. 2001), cert. granted, 122 S. Ct. 456 (U.S. Oct. 29,
2001) (No. 01-298). Lapides squarely raises the question of whether removal triggers waiver. Id. at
456.
131 Cal. Mother & Infant Program v. Cal. Dep't of Corr., 41 F. Supp. 2d 1123, 1128 (S.D. Cal.
1999).
136 In Wisconsin Department of Corrections v. Schacht, 524 U.S. 381 (1998), Justice Kennedy
advocated the establishment of such a rule. Id. at 393 (Kennedy, J., concurring). Justice Kennedy's
Schacht opinion is discussed in greater detail in Part III.B.2.
131 See, e.g., Santee Sioux Tribe ofNeb. v. Nebraska, 121 F.3d 427, 431-32 (8th Cir. 1997)
(noting that under state law, the Attorney General is not authorized to waive immunity); Estate of
Porter v. Illinois, 36 F.3d 684,691 (7th Cir. 1994) (same); Silver v. Baggiano, 804 F.2d 1211, 1214
(11 th Cir. 1986) (same); Gwinn Area Cmty. Sch. v. Michigan, 741 F.2d 840, 846-47 (6th Cir.
1984) (same); David Nursing Home v. Mich. Dep't of Social Serv., 579 F. Supp. 285,288 (E.D.
Mich. 1984) (same); see McLaughlin v. Bd. of Trustees of State Coils. of Colo., 215 F.3d 1168,
1171 (10th Cir. 2000) (noting that under state law, the Attorney General is authorized to waive
immunity); Sutton v. Utah State Sch. for the Deaf& Blind, 173 F.3d 1226, 1234-36 (10th Cir.
1999) (same); Newfield House, Inc. v. Mass. Dep't of Pub. Welfare, 651 F.2d 32, 36 n.3 (1 st Cir.
1981) (same); Cal. Mother & Infant Program, 41 F. Supp.2d at 1127-29 (same); Candela Corp. v.
Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 976 F. Supp. 90, 92-93 (D. Mass. 1997) (holding that the board of
regents is authorized to waive); Me. Assoc. of Indep. Neighborhoods v. Me. Dep't of Human
Serv., 697 F. Supp. 557, 560 (D. Me. 1988) (holding that the Attorney General is authorized to
waive); see also Frances J. v. Wright, 19 F.3d 337, 341 (7th Cir. 1994) (removal is impermissible
unless accompanied by an authoritative waiver).
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waiver of immunity. 38 For example, in Innes v. Kansas State University, 39 the Tenth
Circuit was called upon to decide whether the State of Kansas had waived its
immunity from suit through the participation of Kansas State University (KSU) in the
Federal Perkins Loan Program.140 Though the State had not explicitly waived its
immunity from suit either in its constitution or by statute,' 41 waiver of immunity was
an express term of KSU's contract with the federal government under this
program.142 The court, citing Ford Motor Company, asked "whether KSU had the
authority to waive Eleventh Amendment immunity.' 43 The court answered this
question in the affirmative and upheld the bankruptcy court's dismissal of Kansas'
Eleventh Amendment defense. 144
In Snyder v. State, 45 a case "virtually identical" to Innes, 46 a bankruptcy court in
the District of Nebraska looked to state law to determine whether Nebraska
authorized its state university to waive immunity. In Snyder, however, the court found
that "[e]ven if the debtor.., could show that the Board of Regents voluntarily and
knowingly accepted the terms of the agreement, the Board of Regents did not have
the power to waive the state's immunity.' '147 Thus, even though federal law (as
embodied in the govemment's contract with the state) conditioned receipt of federal
funds on waiver of immunity, and a state official accepted the funds apparently on
these terms, the federal government could not extract a waiver in this particular
case. 148
138 College Savings indicates clearly that waiver may be obtained in this fashion. Coll. Sav.
Bank v. Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd., 527 U.S. 666; 686 (1999). These cases
explore the mechanics of how such waivers take place.
139 184 F.3d 1275 (10th Cir. 1999).
140 Id. at 1277.
141 Id. at 1279.
142 Id. at 1281-82 (noting that "the agreement indicates... that KSU 'agrees to perform the
functions and activities set forth in 34 CFR § 674' and that under § 674 "KSU necessarily
consented to perform certain functions in the federal ... court" (citation omitted)).
143 Id. at 1284.
144ld.
145 228 B.R. 712 (Bankr. D. Neb. 1998).
146 Id. at 717-18.
147 Id. at 718.
148 Since the College Savings decision, many other federal courts have acknowledged the
permissibility of exacting waivers of immunity from the states as a condition of receiving federal
funds. These courts, however, have often failed to consult state law to determine whether the
individual or entity accepting federal funds was authorized to waive immunity. See, e.g., Jim C. v.
United States, 235 F.3d 1079, 1082 (8th Cir. 2000) (en banc); Pederson v. La. State Univ., 213
F.3d 858, 876 (5th Cir. 2000); Bd. of Educ. v. Kelly E., 207 F.3d 931, 935 (7th Cir. 2000);
Sandoval v. Hagan, 197 F.3d 484,500 (11 th Cir. 1999); Litman v. George Mason Univ., 186 F.3d
544 (4th Cir. 1999); Clark v. California, 123 F.3d 1267 (9th Cir. 1997); Huffine v. Cal. State
Univ.-Chico (In re Huffine), 246 B.R. 405,411-12 (Bankr. E.D. Wash. 2000).
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The Ford rule is something of an anomaly in the Supreme Court's waiver-in-
litigation jurisprudence. It involves conduct that, when voluntarily undertaken by state
actors in the courtroom, might reasonably be expected to trigger a waiver of
immunity; it does not, however, effectuate this result. Instead, for reasons that will be
examined in greater depth below, the federal courts are not permitted to infer a waiver
of immunity when states litigate on the merits at the trial level.
Unsurprisingly, a form of the voluntariness principle motivates the Ford decision
and subsequent cases applying it. By structuring the waiver-identification process
around state law, control of the decision whether to waive immunity is firmly
cemented in state hands. The behavior of state officials will entail a waiver of
immunity only when the sovereign state, through its legislature, so desires. 149 If
federal law established the parameters of what conduct constitutes a waiver, and
unauthorized officials were permitted to issue binding waivers, then there might be
cases in which waiver occurred over a state's objection. Binding states to ultra vires
waivers of Eleventh Amendment immunity creates tension with the voluntariness
principle even though these waivers are not elicited through coercion (as one might
find in the abrogation context) or through ignorance (as might be the case in the
absence of clear statement rules). This tension exists because, in these cases, Eleventh
Amendment protection seems to be withdrawn against the will of the sovereign
legislature.
The following two sections of this paper are dedicated to illustrating that the Ford
rule is inconsistent with the waiver-in-litigation case law and is not compelled by the
voluntariness principle or any other principle of constitutional law. Part I examines
the Ford rule in greater detail, demonstrating how it has been applied by the lower
federal courts. One purpose of Part III is to highlight the burdens this rule places on
private litigants. Part IV attempts to show that (1) the basic principles of constructive
waiver doctrine-most fundamentally, the voluntariness principle-do not require the
result in Ford, and (2) the decision in that case cannot be reconciled with waiver-in-
litigation jurisprudence more generally.
Ill. APPLICATIONS OF THE FORD RULE
A. Non- Waivers in Litigation-Stacking the Deck in States 'Favor
In the absence of a federal law effectively governing the question of whether a
state has waived its immunity, states are able to parlay the advantages they enjoy as
149 See Daniel J. Meltzer, Overcoming Immunity: The Case of Federal Regulation of
Intellectual Property, 53 STAN L. REv. 1331, 1387 (2001) (noting, in discussing Ford, that "the
underlying presumption seems to be that ordinarily waiver must be effected either by the legislature
or by an official whom the legislature has authorized to waive").
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possessors of sovereign immunity into other benefits in the litigation process. The
holding in Ford transforms sovereign immunity from a shield, to be raised before
litigation to protect states from suit, into a sword, to be wielded during litigation to
fight off adverse holdings.' 50 This section presents two examples of how the Ford
rule might be employed in this fashion.
1. Delayed Presentation of the Sovereign Immunity Defense
As mentioned above, in FordMotor Company, the State of Indiana did not want
to refund taxes that Ford had paid.' 5' Instead of accomplishing this by responding to
the taxpayer's suit with a motion for dismissal on sovereign immunity grounds, the
State litigated on the merits in the District Court and in front of the Seventh Circuit. '52
When the case came before the Supreme Court, however-a tribunal from which
there is no appeal-the State took cover behind the Eleventh Amendment and
claimed immunity rather than risk a binding loss on the merits.
53
The Supreme Court reasoned that "[t]he Eleventh Amendment declares a policy
and sets forth an explicit limitation on federal judicial power of such compelling force
that this Court will consider the issue arising under this Amendment in this case even
though urged for the first time in this Court."' 5 4 Because, as a matter of Indiana law,
"no properly authorized executive or administrative officer of the state ha[d] waived
the state's immunity to suit in the federal courts," the Supreme Court determined that
the State had not constructively waived its immunity by litigating the case on the
merits.155
In reaching this conclusion, the Court declined to follow what, given our analysis
of the voluntariness principle, would seem to be the most doctrinally sound path. That
is, it declined to articulate a rule pursuant to which a state that voluntarily litigates on
the merits in federal court waives its immunity from suit in that case.
The justification offered by the Supreme Court for its decision is ambiguous and
will be explored in depth in Part IV. For the time being, however, it is important to
perceive that much control over the waiver question and, in fact, over federal
procedure, was ceded to the states in FordMotor Company. With no federal standard
conclusively dictating that litigating on the merits constitutes waiver, state law is the
ultimate determinant of the import of state conduct in federal court. By deciding who
'
50 See Michelle Lawner, Why Federal Courts Should Be Required to Consider State
Sovereign Immunity Sua Sponte, 66 U. CHI. L. REv. 1261, 1272 (1999) ("[T]he Supreme Court's
Eleventh Amendment jurisprudence currently permits states to use the Amendment as both a
sword and a shield .... ).
'5' Ford Motor Co. v. Dep't of the Treasury of Ind., 323 U.S. 459, 460 (1945).
112 Id. at 466-67.
153 See id. at 467.
154 Id.
151 Id. at 469.
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may waive immunity, states implicitly decide what conduct waives immunity.
Under these conditions, states are able to use the federal courts while remaining
free from federally-imposed pressure to waive immunity. Indeed, insofar as an
assertion of sovereign immunity on appeal can always expunge an adverse judgment,
states are totally free from the fundamental constraint faced by private litigants who
appear in federal court: submission to the binding authority of the tribunal. It is in this
respect that the Ford rule introduces an odd twist into the Court's sovereign immunity
jurisprudence. There is no doubt that the Eleventh Amendment places the states in a
very different position from private citizens, and thus the mere fact of different
treatment for a sovereign state is unremarkable. The circumstances surrounding the
Ford rule, however--specifically, the fact that the state seemingly 156 submits
voluntarily to the jurisdiction of the federal courts and is able, nonetheless, to revoke
retroactively that jurisdiction-make this aspect of sovereign immunity doctrine
anomalous.
In Ford Motor Company itself, Indiana was permitted to litigate with the
sovereign immunity card tucked safely away in its back pocket. When the stakes got
high at the Supreme Court level, the State was not forced to test the strength of its
hand against the plaintiff's; instead, it used sovereign immunity to trump Ford's
claim. The permissibility of raising immunity for the first time on appeal (even on
certiorari before the Supreme Court), coupled with the federal courts' powerlessness
to classify the State's conduct as waiver-inducing, enabled Indiana to pursue the
benefits of litigating in federal court without exposing itself to any risk. A victory on
the merits would mean a judicially-confirmed right to retain plaintiff's tax payment,
resjudicata, and the establishment of precedent sympathetic to state interests. Loss at
the trial or appellate level could be remedied bythe Eleventh Amendment. After Ford
Motor Company, a state could extract the benefits of litigating the merits of a case in
federal court without incurring costs other than legal fees. So long as the state
withholds from its attorneys the power to waive sovereign immunity, its conduct in
federal court can be rendered entirely without consequence."'
2. Removalfrom State to Federal Court
The removal cases discussed in Part II.C158 reveal another way in which the Ford
rule might permit states to use the Eleventh Amendment strategically. In these cases,
1561 say "seemingly" because to say that "the State" has waived immunity under such
circumstances begs one of the critical questions here; specifically, whether "the State" can be said
voluntarily to have waived immunity by way of the ultra vires conduct of its officials. Part 1V.D
will take up this question in detail.
157 As one commentator put it, "permitting assertions of Eleventh Amendment immunity for
the first time on appeal enables a state defendant to condition its grant of federal court jurisdiction
over the state on a favorable decision on the merits." Lawner, supra note 150, at 1276.
159 See supra notes 134-37 and accompanying text.
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the state removes to federal court and then seeks dismissal by invoking sovereign
immunity. The reasons to reject this immunity claim are powerful. First, by removing
the case, the state affirmatively invokes the jurisdiction of a federal forum. But for the
state's behavior, the case would never enter the federal courts.' 59 In this respect, the
venerable Clark rule-which distinguishes passive state defendants from active
litigants-suggests implying waiver. 160 Second, this strategy is ripe for exploitation.
States that waive their immunity from suit in state court but not federal court might
evade the consequences of their state court waiver by removing to federal court and
then seeking dismissal. Used in this fashion, the removal power permits states to play
a kind of shell game with potential litigants-holding out the promise of amenability
to suit in state court, then disposing of cases through the federal system.'
61
'59 See Sutton v. Utah Sch. for the Deaf& Blind, 173 F.3d 1226, 1236 (10th Cir. 1999)
(quoting Gunter v. Atl. Coast Line R.R., 200 U.S. 273, 284 (1906)). The court reasoned:
The Attorney General's Office having caused the removal to federal court here, and having
litigated throughout on the merits here, we feel it would be contrary to these precedents as
well as grossly inequitable to allow assertion of the Eleventh Amendment bar by the
contention made at oral argument before us.
Id. (emphasis added).
Using the removal tactic is otherwise similar to defending a case on the merits and then
raising the immunity defense on appeal. And, of course, the two could be used in tandem. A state
that expected the federal courts to be more hospitable to its claim than state courts could invoke
federal jurisdiction by removing from state court. If the state's expectations were upset, and the
federal court found for the plaintiff, the state could raise the immunity defense on appeal.
160 See supra text accompanying note 91.
16 The Supreme Court's decision in Alden renders this discussion at least partially moot.
Because Alden made clear that states enjoy immunity from suit in both state and federal court,
Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 754 (1999), the manipulative aspect of the "remove and dismiss"
strategy largely evaporates. Indeed, under this regime, with states enjoying Eleventh Amendment
immunity in both fora, a rule under which removal triggers waiver would place states in a
considerably worse position than other parties, who may remove from state to federal court without
waiving certain jurisdictional defenses. For example, a number of federal courts have held that
removal from state to federal court does not entail waiver of a challenge to the court's personal
jurisdiction. See, e.g., Cantor Fitzgerald, LP v. Peaslee, 88 F.3d 152, 157 n.4 (2d Cir. 1996)
("Removal does not waive any Rule 12(b) defenses."); Silva v. City of Madison, 69 F.3d 1368,
1376 (7th Cir. 1995); Fields v. Sedgwick Associated Risks, Ltd., 796 F.2d 299, 300-01 (9th Cir.
1986) ("Fields contends that the defendant's failure to raise personal jurisdiction in its state court
motion waived the issue. We disagree."). And, indeed, under these conditions, there appears to be
nojustification for treating the state's presentation of an Eleventh Amendment defense differently
from a private party's objection to the court's exercise of personal jurisdiction. In both cases, the
defendant might reasonably want to have a federal court, rather than a state court, adjudicate the
jurisdictional challenge.
The discussion of the removal cases remains relevant for the following reasons. First, and
most important, the structure of the problem that existed during the relatively brief period between
Seminole Tribe and Alden, when the "remove and dismiss" strategy might have been employed by
states to craft immunity claims where they otherwise would not exist, has significant parallels to
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One way of rendering this move ineffective would be to establish remand, rather
than dismissal, as the proper disposition of a case in which a state has removed to
federal court and then asserted Eleventh Amendment immunity. And, indeed, a
number of federal courts have done exactly that. 62 As the leading commentators have
noted, however, "the question of dismissal or remand of claims barred by the
Eleventh Amendment" is "up in the air.,,163 And if sovereign immunity is, for these
purposes, construed as something like an affirmative defense-as some courts have
suggested it should be understood' 64-then dismissal would be the proper procedural
the Ford scenario. Specifically, this removal scenario gives rise to the question of whether state or
federal law ultimately controls the import of state official's conduct in federal court. It is, therefore,
useful to consider this aspect of the doctrine, even if it is far less likely to occur.
Moreover, there are at least two circumstances in which the "remove and dismiss" strategy
might still be effective: (1) where the state has waived immunity in state but not federal court, and
(2) where state courts are required to entertain private damages action against non-consenting
states. See Reich v. Collins, 513 U.S. 106, 110 (1994) (noting that in the absence of an adequate
pre-deprivation remedy, a state court remedy must be available to taxpayers who wish to challenge
the constitutionality of a state tax, "the sovereign immunity States traditionally enjoy in their own
courts notwithstanding").
As to the first possibility, political concerns might lead a state legislature to pass a statute
waiving immunity from state court suits in certain classes of cases, knowing all the while that the
possibility of serious loss to the state treasury is controlled by the availability of the removal-
dismissal two-step. State legislators would enjoy the political benefits of enacting a broad waiver
of immunity and then might blame the Attorney General's office for the litigation tactics in any
particular case where the state managed to exercise its Eleventh Amendment immunity by
employing this removal scheme. In addition to the complications this creates for a particular litigant
with respect to whom the state engendered expectations of amenability to suit bypassing a statute
waiving immunity, this scheme creates an accountability problem. The roles played by the state
legislature and executive might be insufficiently transparent to permit voters to perceive whom to
hold responsible for the evaporating waiver of immunity.
162 See, e.g., Estate of Porter v. Illinois, 36 F.3d 684, 691 (7th Cir. 1994) (remanding, rather
than dismissing, a claim removed to federal court and subsequently barred by the Eleventh
Amendment); Silver v. Baggiano, 804 F.2d 1211, 1219 (11 th Cir. 1986) (vacating and remanding a
claim removed to federal court); Gwinn Area Cmty. Sch. v. Michigan, 741 F.2d 840, 847 (6th Cir.
1984) (directing the district court to remand claims to state courts).
163 RICHARD H. FALLON, JR. ET AL., HART AND WECHSLER'S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE
FEDERAL SYSTEM 138-39 (Supp. 1999) (noting that if an Eleventh Amendment defense goes to
subject matter jurisdiction, "remand would seem not only appropriate but mandatory. But if
not,. . .dismissal [might be] the correct remedy, just as in the case of any other successful non-
jurisdictional defense"). For more on the "nature" of the sovereign immunitydefense see infra Part
[V.A.
'64See, e.g., Higgins v. Mississippi, 217 F.3d 951, 953 (7th Cir. 2000) (suggesting that
Eleventh Amendment immunity might be deemed jurisdictional in diversity cases, but an
affirmative defense in others); ITSI TV Prod., Inc. v. Agric. Assocs., 3 F.3d 1289, 1291 (9th Cir.
1993) ("Eleventh Amendment immunity thus does not implicate a federal court's subject matter
jurisdiction in any ordinary sense.... Rather, we believe that Eleventh Amendment immunity,
whatever its jurisdictional attributes, should be treated as an affirmative defense.").
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mechanism for disposing of such cases.
In any event, and critically for purposes of this article, even if the Supreme Court
determined that removal to federal court does trigger a waiver of immunity,165 under
Ford Motor Company the effectiveness of such a rule would ultimately turn on state
and not federal law. State authorization would be necessary for removal to be
accompanied by a waiver of immunity. As mentioned above, some federal courts that
have determined that removal should trigger waiver have also inquired-in
accordance with the Ford rule-whether the official who engineered the removal was
empowered to waive immunity. 166 Thus, the right combination of rules would permit
states to evade the consequences of state court waivers of immunity in every case.'
67
Both of these applications of the Ford rule leave private litigants at a serious
disadvantage when trying to sue states. In the first scenario, a litigant might expend a
great deal of resources in making her case against a sovereign defendant, only to have
the rug pulled out from under her as a consequence of her success. In the second
example, the removal power permits states to upset the expectations of litigants
engendered by the passage of legislation exposing the state to suit. Critically, in the
first scenario, the federal courts serve as mere tools of state will-their judgments are
binding only if states approve.
B. Criticisms of the Ford Rule
One federal court, when called upon to adjudicate a sovereign immunity defense,
noted that "[t]he Eleventh Amendment is not designed to give procedural advantage
to state litigants, but to shield states from unconsented actions against them."' 68 The
cases discussed in Part Il.A demonstrate that states have been able to squeeze
procedural advantages out of the Eleventh Amendment. By "us[ing] the Eleventh
Amendment as a tool of strategic litigation" in the ways described above, states have
been able (unlike any other litigant) to proceed in the federal courts without risk. 169
Criticism of the rules that permit such opportunistic behavior appeared in a study
conducted by the American Law Institute during the late 1960s170 and, more
pointedly, in a concurring opinion authored by Justice Kennedy thirty years later in
Wisconsin Department of Corrections v. Schacht.1711 will consider these critiques in
turn.
163 The Supreme Court will decide this question this Term. See supra note 134.
'66 See supra note 137 (examples of courts using this approach).
167 See RJcHARD H. FALLON, JR. ET AL., HART AND WECHSLER'S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND
THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 92-93 (Supp. 1998) (explaining that "if dismissal is the appropriate remedy,
any effort to sue a state on a federal claim in a state court will inevitably fail").
161 In re Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 964 F.2d 1128, 1134 (Fed. Cir. 1992).
169 Lawner, supra note 150, at 1262.70 AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, STUDY OF THE DIVISION OF JURISDICTION BETWEEN STATE AND
FEDERAL COURTS (1969) [hereinafter ALl STUDY].
171 524 U.S. 381, 393-98 (1998).
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1. The ALI Study
In 1969, the American Law Institute published its Study of the Division of
Jurisdiction Between State and Federal Courts. In a section entitled "Raising and
Foreclosure of Jurisdictional Issues," the Study proposed a rule that might reduce
manipulation of the federal courts, including (potentially) strategic use of Eleventh
Amendment immunity. That rule states:
After the commencement of trial on the merits in the district court, or following any
prior decision of a district court that is dispositive of the merits, no court of the
United States shall consider, either on its own motion or at the insistence of any
party, a question ofjurisdiction over the subject matter of the case .... 72
This proposal is a general one. It applies to delayed presentation of any objection
to a federal court's subject matter jurisdiction, not merely to deferred assertions of a
sovereign immunity defense. In fact, applied in the Eleventh Amendment context, the
rule is in unmistakable tension with the Ford decision. If enforced, it would strip a
state of its immunity if it litigated a case on the merits in federal court-the very
outcome explicitly deemed unacceptable by the Ford Court.173
The Study took up the argument, unenthusiastically relied upon in Ford itself,174
that prohibiting late-stage assertion of an Eleventh Amendment claim runs afoul of
Article I of the Constitution insofar as such a rule would permit federal courts to
hear cases that are, as a technical matter, beyond their subject matter jurisdiction.175
The authors of the Study acknowledged that if parties could not bring defects in
subject matter jurisdiction to the courts' attention once trial has begun, the federal
172 ALI STUDY, supra note 170, § 1386(a).
173 Perhaps with an eye to avoiding this tension with Supreme Court precedent and,
potentially, with Article III of the Constitution, the Study established exceptions to the proposed
rule, including one for circumstances in which "[c]onsideration ofajurisdictional defect at [a late]
stage of the proceedings is required by the Constitution." ALI STUDY, supra note 170,
§ 1386(a)(5). The other exceptions to the rule on foreclosure ofjurisdictional issues in the ALI
Study are geared primarily toward permitting litigants to raisejurisdictional challenges that could
not have been raised earlier due to lack of information and toward giving the federal courts the
flexibility to defer consideration ofjurisdictional questions when appropriate. See id. § 1386(1)-
(4). If the Ford rule is, in fact, necessary to preserve the voluntariness of waivers of sovereign
immunity, then it might be constitutionally compelled within the meaning of this exception and
sovereign immunity cases would fall outside the ambit of the rule proposed by the ALI Study. See
infra Parts IV.B & C.
174 See supra text accompanying note 128.
175 Indeed, the Supreme Court has explained that "no action of the parties can confer subject-
matterjurisdiction upon a federal court. Thus, the consent of the parties is irrelevant... and a party
does not waive the [subject matter jurisdiction] requirement by failing to challenge jurisdiction




courts might be compelled to adjudicate claims beyond their constitutional reach.' 176
The authors emphasized, however, that "[i]t is necessary and proper to the exercise of
Article II power that procedures be devised to require issues of jurisdiction to be
timely raised, and to prevent their use to take unfair advantage of opposing parties or
to impede the administration of justice.' 171
In the commentary accompanying its formal recommendations, the ALl justified
its proposal in language that calls to mind the tactics employed by states in the
Eleventh Amendment cases considered in the previous section. The Study explained
that "a wily defendant may conceal a known jurisdictional defect... , then obtain
dismissal, and achieve total immunity from suit.' ' 178 "[T]he party who has invoked
jurisdiction may subsequently challenge it if the result of a trial on the merits is
unfavorable.... [T]his fetish of federal jurisdiction is wholly inconsistent with sound
judicial administration"' 79 and, the report would later note, "unfair."' 0 These
concems are equally implicated when state sovereign immunity provides the basis for
the jurisdictional challenge.
2. Justice Kennedy's Approach
In Wisconsin Department of Corrections v. Schacht,8' the Supreme Court faced
the question of whether the presence of a claim that is barred by the Eleventh
Amendment in an otherwise removable case destroys removal jurisdiction over the
entire suit. 82 The Court held that, under such circumstances, a federal court need not
remand the entire case, and it may exercise jurisdiction over the non-barred claims.'183
Justice Kennedy, meanwhile, authored a concurring opinion in which he noted that
the Court had "neither reached nor considered the argument that, by giving its express
consent to removal of the case from state court, Wisconsin waived its Eleventh
Amendment immunity."' 184 Justice Kennedy proceeded to make the case that removal
should trigger waiver.8 5 He presented two arguments, one rooted in precedent, the
176 See ALl STUDY, supra note 170, at 368.
177 id.
171 Id. at 366.
179 Id. at 366; see also id. at 367 (noting that the proposed rule would "provide every incentive
to both sides to seek resolution of the issue of subject-matter jurisdiction prior to the
commencement of trial").
18o ld. at 368.
... 524 U.S. 381 (1998).
112 Schacht, 524 U.S. at 383. The fact scenario at play in Schacht is less likely to arise in the
post-Alden era. After Alden, a state could, in most cases, as easily assert Eleventh Amendment
immunity in state court as in federal court.
83 Id. at 392-93.
114 Id. at 393 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
..5 For reasons discussed above, Justice Kennedy's opinion had much more bite beforeAlden
v. Maine was decided. See supra note 161.
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other in considerations of fairness.
First, Justice Kennedy called to mind the distinction drawn in Clark between the
state as an active or passive litigant. "By electing to remove, the State created the
difficult problem confronted in the Court of Appeals and now here. This is the
situation in which law usually says a party must accept the consequences of its own
acts.' 186 As indicated in Part lI.B. 1, when a state stops behaving as a "mere
defendant," there are, ordinarily, Eleventh Amendment ramifications.187 Justice
Kennedy used the rhetoric of voluntariness to emphasize this point:
Since a State which is made a defendant to a state court action is under no
compulsion to appear in federal court and, like any other defendant, has the
unilateral right to block removal of the case, any appearance the State makes in
federal court may well be regarded as voluntary in the same manner as the
appearances which gave rise to the waivers in Clark and Gardner.188
From this perspective, Justice Kennedy explained, the voluntariness principle (as
expounded in the Supreme Court's waiver-in-litigation precedents) does not compel
upholding the State's claim to immunity. In Justice Kennedy's view, the Court could
infer waiver from the State's decision to remove, and it could do so without infringing
upon that State's power to choose.
Justice Kennedy then noted:
In permitting the belated assertion of the Eleventh Amendment bar, we allow States
to proceed to judgment without facing any real risk of adverse consequences.
Should the State prevail, the plaintiff would be bound by principles ofresjudicata. If
the State were to lose, however, it could void the entire judgment simply by
asserting its immunity on appeal. 18
9
Justice Kennedy expressed "doubts about the propriety of this rule," and advocated
"modiqication] of our Eleventh Amendment jurisprudence" so as to "eliminate the
unfairness" it permits.' 90
The next section of this article will consider how the modifications encouraged
by Justice Kennedy might be established, and it will argue that Ford Motor Company
is out-of-step with constructive waiver jurisprudence generally and the waiver-in-
186 Id. (emphasis added).
187 See supra text accompanying note 91.
... Schacht, 524 U.S. at 395-96 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (emphasis added).
89 Id. at 394.
'9°Id. at 394-95 (noting that with such modifications "States would be prevented from
gaining an unfair advantage").
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litigation cases in particular. 19' My primary focus will be the rule that permits states to
raise an Eleventh Amendment defense for the first time on appeal and the related rule
that the question of what conduct triggers a waiver of immunity is ultimately one of
state law. I will argue that the act of litigating a case on the merits in federal court
should trigger a waiver of state sovereign immunity. This argument will not be
qualified, as the ALL proposal is, with exceptions for cases of tension with the
Constitution. Instead, I contend that this rule does no violence to the voluntariness
principle and that it is within the constitutional limitations identified in the Supreme
Court's waiver jurisprudence stretching all the way from Clark to College Savings.
IV. ESTABLISHING FEDERAL RULES-CONDITIONING STATES' USE OF THE
FEDERAL COURTS ON PARTIAL WAIVER OF SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY
States may be required to waive their sovereign immunity as a condition of
litigating on the merits in federal court without offending the Eleventh Amendment.
The holding of Ford Motor Company-which allows the state to raise an Eleventh
Amendment claim for the first time on appeal-cannot be reconciled with the body of
waiver jurisprudence as a whole. 92 This part of the article offers a defense for this
claim, and it urges that a rule implying waiver of immunity from failure to raise an
Eleventh Amendment claim at the trial level would produce greater doctrinal
consistency in the Court's waiver-in-litigation jurisprudence.
First, this section will assess the Court's unwillingness to institute a constructive
waiver rule in Ford Motor Company. The Court's initial justification for its
conclusion-the notion that Eleventh Amendment immunity is inherently
jurisdictional-cannot withstand even minimal scrutiny. Next, and crucially, this
section will turn to the voluntariness principle and show that it poses no obstacle to
conditioning access to the federal courts on waiver of immunity. Though important
additional complications exist, satisfying the voluntariness requirement is essential,
for it represents the primary constitutional constraint on waiver. This section will
conclude by addressing the second justification offered in Ford Motor Company,
which is also grounded in a version of the voluntariness principle: the notion that state
law must determine who is empowered to waive immunity. I will demonstrate that a
rule conditioning federal court access on waiver may coexist with state control over
official authority to waive Eleventh Amendment rights.
A. The Ford Court's Explanation
The Ford Court justified its holding, first, by appealing to Article III and to the
"nature" of Eleventh Amendment immunity. Justice Reed explained that the Eleventh
191 Justice Kennedy noted that Ford "is not an insuperable obstacle" to such changes in
waiver doctrine. Id. at 397.
192 Ford Motor Co. v. Dep't of Treasury of Ind., 323 U.S. 459,466 (1945).
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Amendment bar is inherently jurisdictional,1 93 and therefore, like other claims going
to the subject matter jurisdiction of the federal courts, it may be raised at any time
during the proceedings. 194 The Court cited no authority for this proposition and failed
to account for the characteristics of Eleventh Amendment immunity that distinguish it
from conventional issues of subject matter jurisdiction. For example, in Patsy v.
Board of Regents of the State of Florida,195 the Supreme Court held that Eleventh
Amendment claims, unlike claims that go directly to the federal courts' subject matter
jurisdiction, need not be raised by the federal courts sua sponte. 196 And it is well-
established that, in contrast to other purelyjurisdictional claims, sovereign immunity
is waivable.197 These traits of Eleventh Amendment immunity suggest strongly that it
does not fit neatly into the subject matter jurisdiction category, thereby calling into
doubt Justice Reed's line of argument in Ford. Notwithstanding the flimsiness of its
roots, the authority of the Ford Court's holding on this point was confirmed by the
Supreme Court decades later in Edelman v. Jordan:
Respondent urges that since the various Illinois officials sued in the District Court
failed to raise the Eleventh Amendment as a defense to the relief sought by
respondent, petitioner is therefore barred from raising the Eleventh Amendment
defense in the Court of Appeals or in this Court.... [I]t has been well settled since
the decision in Ford Motor Co. v. Department of Treasury, that the Eleventh
Amendment defense sufficiently partakes of the nature of a jurisdictional bar so that
it need not be raised in the trial court ... .1 98
The shakiness of the foundation on which the Edelman holding rests has not
escaped the notice of the federal courts. In Hill v. Blind Industries and Services of
Maryland,'99 the Ninth Circuit explained:
Notwithstanding the assertion that th[is] rule was "well settled," Edelman did not
cite (and we have not found) any Supreme Court decision during the 29-year
interval between Ford Motor and Edelman in which the Court stated that an
Eleventh Amendment defense need not be raised in the trial court. 200
The panel went on to question the notion that the Eleventh Amendment "sufficiently
partakes of the nature of a jurisdictional bar," such that it may be raised at any time
'
93 Id. at 467 ("The Eleventh Amendment declares a policy and sets forth an explicit limitation
on federal judicial power.").
194 id.
195 457 U.S. 496 (1982).
19 6 Id. at 515 n.19.
197 See Clark v. Bamard, 108 U.S. 436,447 (1883) (indicating that "[t]he immunity from suit
belonging to a state.., is a personal privilege which it may waive at pleasure").
198 Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 677-78 (1974).
199 179 F.3d 754 (9th Cir. 1999).
200 Id. at 762.
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during the proceedings. 20 ' This reasoning, the court explained, "might be considered
the judicial equivalent of being 'almost pregnant.' Either the Eleventh Amendment
limits the court's subject matter jurisdiction, in which case it can never be waived, or
else it is not a jurisdictional bar., 20 2
Though the Ninth Circuit's approach is excessively formalistic (i.e., there is no
reason sovereign immunity could not be classified as some combination of
jurisdictional bar and affirmative defense203 --though perhaps it should not be), it
shows that the Ford and Edelman Courts' unqualified reliance on the jurisdictional
nature of the sovereign immunity defense is inadequate. As the Supreme Court
explained, "[w]hile the Eleventh Amendment is jurisdictional in the sense that it is a
limitation on the federal court's judicial power.., we have recognized that it is not
coextensive with the limitations on judicial power in Article Ifl." 204 And numerous
other federal courts have acknowledged that Eleventh Amendment immunity defies
strict classification as "jurisdictional" in nature. 205 To the extent that the Ford Court's
justification for permitting delayed presentation of the immunity defense rests on an
assertion about the intrinsic "nature" of Eleventh Amendment immunity, the
justification fails to persuade. The Amendment's nature is deeply ambiguous.
B. The Voluntariness Principle and Ford Motor Company
Though the first justification offered by the Ford Court for its holding is lacking,
it would be a mistake to jump to the conclusion that a rule conditioning states' right to
litigate on the merits in federal court on waiver of sovereign immunity is
unproblematic. It remains necessary to consider whether such a rule is in tension with
the voluntariness principle. I begin this analysis by retuming to the Supreme Court's
most recent extended discussion of constructive waiver.
In College Savings Bankv. Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Education Expense
Board,2°6 a bare majority of the Court defined as "coercive" circumstances in which a
State's refusal to waive its immunity prompts its exclusion from "otherwise lawful
activity."207 Under such conditions, Justice Scalia explained, "the point of coercion is
automatically passed-and the voluntariness of waiver [is] destroyed."20 8 This
understanding of voluntariness casts doubt upon rules that attach conditions to use of
the federal courts. It is undoubtedly lawful for a State to defend itself against suits in
201 Id. (quoting Edelman, 415 U.S. at 678).
202 Id.
203 See Wis. Dep't of Corr. v. Schacht, 524 U.S. 381, 394 (1998) (Kennedy, J., concurring)
(taking note of the "hybrid nature of the jurisdictional bar erected by the Eleventh Amendment").
204 Calderon v. Ashmus, 523 U.S. 740, 745 n.2 (1998).
205 See, e.g., Higgins v. Mississippi, 217 F.3d 951, 953 (7th Cir. 2000); ITSI T.V. Prod. v.
Agric. Ass'ns, 3 F.3d 1289, 1291 (9th Cir. 1993).
20' 527 U.S. 666 (1999).207 Id. at 687.
208 Id.
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federal court. So, to the extent that a rule conditioning the right to litigate on the
merits in federal court on waiver of immunity obstructs states' participation in
otherwise lawful activity, it seems to be inconsistent with Justice Scalia's instruction
in College Savings.
20 9
There is compelling evidence, however, that this language from College Savings
should not be taken too literally-it is not the stuff of a strict doctrinal test. The
College Savings majority expressly recognized two exceptions to the "otherwise
lawful activity" rule: Congress is permitted to condition both the grant of federal
funds and its consent to an interstate compact on states' willingness to waive
immunity. 2' ° In both of these scenarios, states are excluded from what would
otherwise be lawful conduct if they refuse to forego their immunity from certain suits.
Nevertheless, such conditions are permissible because the right to engage in these
activities is bestowed as a "gift" or "gratuity" by the federal government.2 ' The
withholding of "gifts or gratuities" from the states, in the College Savings Court's
view, is not the kind of threatened sanction that destroys the voluntariness of a waiver.
When gifts or gratuities are withheld, it seems, the states do not really "lose anything"
significant. In contrast, the loss associated with exclusion from regulated activity was
deemed too great for the states to bear. Accordingly, Parden-style waivers were held
invalid.212
From this perspective, Justice Scalia's admonition with respect to otherwise
lawful activity does not seem, of its own force, to identify a clear line between
voluntary and involuntary waiver. Rather, it directs the federal courts to assess
carefully the sanction imposed upon states for their refusal to waive immunity. The
appropriate question, then, is not whether the act of litigating on the merits in federal
court is "otherwise lawful." Like participation in federally regulated activity, entry
into interstate compacts, or acceptance of federal funds, it surely is. Instead, the
critical inquiry seems to be whether excluding states from the practice in question
exacts too high a cost.
The inquiry into cost is, at bottom, a normative one. Assessments of how high is
too high will inevitably be colored by differing perceptions of the value of state
sovereign immunity and of the benefits accrued by exacting waivers. Whether one
deems voluntary constructive waivers of the sort at issue in Ford Motor Company
will depend largely on one's assessment of the costs to states of their partial exclusion
from the federal courts and of the costs to private litigants and the federal courts of
permitting states to use sovereign immunity to their advantage in the ways described
in Part I.A.
The Supreme Court has not left us entirely without direction in assessing these
209 The Eleventh Circuit acknowledged, without embracing, this line of argument in Lapides
v. Board of Regents of the University of Georgia, 251 F.3d 1372, 1378 n.5 (11 th Cir. 2001).210 See supra text accompanying notes 31-37.
211 Coll. Say. Bank, 527 U.S. at 686-87.
212 See supra text accompanying notes 25-30.
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costs. The cases outlined in Part ll.B provide insight into how the Supreme Court has
traditionally valued states' right of access to the federal courts. Waiver-in-litigation
jurisprudence indicates that it is not at all uncommon for states' uses of standard
litigation practices to be conditioned on waiver of Eleventh Amendment protection.
Consider the following: Clark sets limits on a state's right to intervene as a claimant
to a fund in controversy before a federal court;2" 3 Gardner attaches conditions to
states' decisions to file proofs of claim in bankruptcy court and to press their rights to
part of a bankrupt estate;2 14 cases such as Creative Goldsmiths assign costs to states'
filing suits as plaintiffs. 215 In all of these scenarios, exclusion from the federal courts
is the price of retaining immunity, yet the cost has not been deemed impermissibly
high.2
16
Is there a reason to treat the proposed rule-conditioning the right to litigate on
the merits on waiver of immunity-differently from these other waiver-in-litigation
cases? Do the bankruptcy and counterclaim cases differ in some significant way from
cases involving state defendants?
One might contend that these other waiver-in-litigation cases do not actually
involve waivers of immunity at all, while a rule that conditions litigating on the merits
217
on amenability to suit would entail genuine waivers. This contention rests on the
notion that states are exposed to damages liability in the latter context but not the
former. The possibility of affirmative relief against a state does not exist in the Clark,
Gardner, or Creative Goldsmiths scenarios. A state does not expose its treasury to
potential losses by laying claim to a fund as an intervenor, and the federal courts have
been careful to confine the implied waivers in the bankruptcy and counterclaim cases
218to claims for recoupment. Unlike a traditional counterclaim, "recoupment only
213 Clark v. Barnard, 108 U.S. 436, 447-48 (1883).
214 Gardner v. New Jersey, 329 U.S. 565, 573-74 (1947).
215 Schlossberg v. Maryland (In re Creative Goldsmiths of Washington D.C., Inc.), 119 F.3d
1140, 1148 (4th Cir. 1997).216 Though, on the surface, these cases do not seem to present conditional benefits questions,
on closer analysis it is easy to conceptualize them as such. States wishing to lay claim to the estate
of a bankrupt party are faced with a choice. They can forego their claim to the funds they wish to
recover and retain their immunity from suit, or they can file a proof of claim in federal bankruptcy
court and expose themselves to counterclaims up to the amount they affirmatively seek to recover.
Similarly, states wishing to intervene and lay claim to a fund in controversy do so on condition of
waiver. The conditional nature of these activities becomes apparent when one considers the
impossibility (after cases such as Clark and Gardner) of a state intervening or filing a proof of
claim without waiving immunity.
217 Cf Arecibo Comm. Health Care, Inc., v. Puerto Rico, 270 F.3d 17,25 n. 11 (1 st Cir. 2001)
("Indeed, the court in College Savings could have limited the import of Gardner by characterizing
it as a decision that does not implicate the Eleventh Amendment at all.").
218 See, e.g., United States v. Kennedy (In re Greenstreet, Inc.), 209 F.2d 660, 663 (7th Cir.
1954) ("[A] party sued by the United States may recoup damages arising out of the same
transaction ... so as to reduce or defeat the government's claim."); In re Monongahela Rye
Liquors, 141 F.2d 864, 869 (3rd Cir. 1944) ("A defendant's right... is one ofrecoupment [which]
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reduces [a] plaintiffs claim; it does not allow recovery of affirmative money
judgment for any excess over that claim."21 9 From this perspective, the counterclaims
to which a state exposes itself as a plaintiff or by filing a proof of claim might be
conceived of as "defenses" to the state's claim rather than affirmative suits which
raise Eleventh Amendment problems. In contrast, permitting a suit to go forward
against a state-defendant necessitates a true surrender of immunity insofar as state
funds are put at risk in a way that they are not in the other waiver-in-litigation cases.
And, the Supreme Court cases repeatedly emphasize that the federal courts should
exercise caution when implying waiver under circumstances that might expose states
to damages liability, so perhaps implied waiver would be inappropriate here.22 °
This argument, however, proves to be rooted entirely in formalism and misses the
more important points of similarity between different varieties of waiver-in-litigation.
For starters, the federal courts have not characterized the counterclaims permitted in
the bankruptcy cases as "defenses" against sovereign plaintiffs. The courts have not
shied away from the fact that these decisions authorize actual waivers of immunity.221
Thus, the notion that these waiver-in-litigation scenarios do not involve "true"
waivers of immunity is not supported by the language of the cases themselves. The
proper question to ask when determining whether there has been a waiver of
immunity is whether a state is susceptible to a suit that it otherwise would not be.
Whether the otherwise-barred suit can be recast as a "defense" is beside the point.
is in the nature of a defense arising out of some feature of the transaction upon which the plaintiff's
action is grounded.") (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).
" 9 BLACK'S LAW DICnONARY 1275 (6th ed. 1990).
220 For example, in Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 665 (1974), the Court stated:
It is one thing to tell [a state official] that he must comply with the federal standards for the
future if the state is to have the benefit of federal funds in the programs he administers. It is
quite another thing to order the [state official] to use state funds to make reparation for the
past. The latter would appear to us to fall afoul of the Eleventh Amendment.
Id. (quoting Rothstein v. Wyman, 467 F.2d 226, 236-37 (2d Cir. 1972) (internal quotation marks
omitted)). But see id at 668 (noting that "an ancillary effect on the state treasury is a permissible
and often an inevitable consequence of the principle announced in Exparte Young'---suits seeking
injunctions against state officials may go forward without violating the Eleventh Amendment).
221 See, e.g., Creative Goldsmiths, 119 F.3d at 1147 (discussing in the bankruptcy context
"whether a state has waived its Eleventh Amendment immunity") (emphasis added); Fed. Say. &
Loan Ins. Corp. v. Quinn, 419 F.2d 1014, 1017 (7th Cir. 1969) ("[T]he waiver of immunity is
limited to matters in recoupment .... ) (emphasis added); Frederick v. United States, 386 F.2d
481, 488 (5th Cir. 1967) (inquiring, in the context of a counterclaim against the United States,
whether "when the sovereign sues it waives immunity as to claims of the defendant which assert
matters in recoupment") (emphasis added); United States v. Kallen (In re Oxford Mktg., Ltd.), 444
F. Supp. 399,403 (N.D. Ill. 1978) ("Courts have applied a parallel analysis to determine the scope
of the Government's waiver of sovereign immunity when its complaint is answered with a
counterclaim.") (emphasis added). But see United States v. Iron Mountain Mines, Inc., 952 F.
Supp. 673,676 (E.D. Cal. 1996) (stating that "[a] claim in recoupment is traditionally described as
purely a defensive claim").
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Moreover, as a functional matter, while it is reasonable to proceed with caution
when making state funds susceptible to collection, the effort to distinguish these cases
on such terms does not hold up. When a state files suit as a plaintiff, the proceeds
from a successful suit enrich the state treasury but for any counterclaims made
possible by the implied waiver of immunity. Therefore, the potential for private
litigants to diminish the amount of funds in the state treasury is present in the
counterclaim context just as it is when a state is made a defendant. The only
difference is that, in the counterclaim case, the funds are not formally transferred to
the state before the opposing party is permitted to collect.2
222 The argument could be made that the formal act of transferring funds to the state treasury
is of dispositive significance in the sovereign immunity context and that counterclaims are
therefore meaningfully different from suits against state-defendants. In an article surveying the
history of sovereign immunity, Professor Jaffe explored circumstances in which a similar
distinction seemed to control. He took note of differences in the Supreme Court's disposition of
suits against the government to recover private property that was wrongfully held by the
government (claims sounding in tort) and suits seeking specific performance of contracts with the
government. Louis L. Jaffe, Suits Against Governments and Officers: Sovereign Immunity, 77
HARV. L. REv. 1, 24 (1963). Jaffe explained that "[for the most part the Court will not entertain
actions to compel the transfer of land which has come lawfully into the possession of the state or
actions to enforce contracts." Id. The cases collected by Jaffe suggest that, in the contract scenario,
permitting suit to go forward might require "delivery [of] property of the United States." Id. at 31.
In contrast, a tort suit "would not expend itself on the public treasury or domain, or interfere with
the public administration." Id. (quoting Land v. Dollar, 330 U.S. 731, 736-38 (1947) (internal
quotation marks omitted)). Thus, the apparent distinction between contract and tort claims is that
the former, but not the latter, might entail invasion of the state treasury. When states possess
specifically identifiable properties or funds that were unlawfully obtained, they are not "a part of
the state treasury" in the same way that lawfully obtained funds are.
This reasoning could also provide the basis for a rule permitting counterclaims against state
plaintiffs to go forward but prohibiting suits against state defendants, even when the state chooses
to litigate on the merits. Counterclaim suits permit the courts to assess whether the funds that the
state wishes to absorb into the treasury might lawfully be transferred to the state as an original
matter. Suits against state defendants, on the other hand, seek to extract funds that lawfully came
into the state's possession.
Of course, the state treasury suffers a loss even when it returns property that it is holding
unlawfully. That property might otherwise be dedicated to some public use or sold. Regardless of
how it came to be in the government's possession, if property is to be returned to private hands,
any governmental purpose it was to serve must either be abandoned or served, at some cost, by
property from another source. Thus it is not the mere fact of "interfering with the public
administration" that distinguishes these cases. Furthermore, the failure to perform contractual
duties arguably transforms some fragment of the funds in the state treasury into unlawfully-held
funds-compliance with the law would demand turning them over to the party seeking
performance. So the tort-contract distinction, at least insofar as it rests on assertions about the
lawful containment of funds in the state treasury or on the real costs to the sovereign of
susceptibility to suit, proves to be a distinction without a difference.
In his dissenting opinion in Larson v. Domestic & Foreign Commerce Corp., 337 U.S. 682
(1949), Justice Frankfurter examined complications arising from the tort-contract distinction. He
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Of course, in the sovereign immunity context, peculiar formalities are not at all
unusual.22 3 And, for this reason, the functional similarities between permissible
counterclaims on the one hand, and waivers of immunity by state-defendants on the
other, might be perceived as inadequate to justify any further incursion on the states'
sovereign power.
It is especially important, therefore, that cases in which states decide to litigate on
the merits share a vital characteristic with other waiver-in-litigation cases. In all of
these circumstances, a state seeks to extract a benefit from the federal courts. It is true
that when a state is made a defendant, it is involuntarily haled into court. In contrast,
the state is a more active player when it intervenes or otherwise files in federal court
when it need not. Still, when the sovereign immunity defense is available, a state-
defendant is under no obligation to proceed. As Justice Kennedy stressed in his
Schacht concurrence, a state that removes a case "is under no compulsion to appear in
noted that "the right of control over property may depend on compliance with the terms of a
contract." Id. at 727-28 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting). Therefore, determining whether a suit may go
forward by asking who is the rightful owner of the contested property is question-begging. For the
viability of a tort claim for wrongful withholding of property may very well turn on whether there
has been a breach of contract. Justice Frankfurter went on to explain that the federal courts "had
jurisdiction over [such] controvers[ies] because only after a consideration of the merits of [such a]
claim could it be determined whether the decree would affect Government property."Id. at 728-29
(Frankfurter, J., dissenting). The same reasoning applies to a distinction between counterclaims and
suits against state defendants. Whether the state treasury is improperly diminished can only be
determined after consideration of the merits of a plaintiff's claim. Counterclaims do not represent
any less of a threat to state funds than do affirmative suits.
Another way of conceptualizing this difficulty is to contend thatjust as there is a cap in play in
the bankruptcy and counterclaim cases-limiting the scope of a claim against the state to the
amount it seeks as a plaintiff or claimant-there should be a similar limitation placed on suits
against state defendants, thus rendering the claim essentially one for a declaratory judgment by
limiting the state's damage exposure to the amount it seeks to recover by defending on the merits
(zero dollars). But this way of understanding the recoupment cap misses the mark. The best wayto
read these waiver-in-litigation cases is as establishing a rule pursuant to which invoking the
jurisdiction of the federal courts triggers a waiver of immunity from suit. The cap contains the
scope of the waiver so that it does not exceed an amount reasonably within the contemplation of
the state when it files suit or files a claim. If limitless counterclaims were permitted, a state might
reasonably argue that it did not voluntarily consent to have a court decide a claim against it for, say,
$1 million by filing a suit to recover $50,000. In contrast, where a state decides to litigate on the
merits as a defendant, it cannot claim ignorance of the potential scope of its exposure, for this
amount will be clarified in the complaint. Thus, while the recoupment cap is necessary to preserve
the voluntariness of the waivers in the bankruptcy and counterclaim cases, it is not needed for this
purpose when a state is a defendant.
223 See, e.g., Ex Parte Young, 209 U.S. 123, 155-56 (1908) (acknowledging that, while the
Eleventh Amendment prevents suits for injunctive relief directly against a state,'"individuals, who,
as officers of the State... threaten and are about to commence proceedings, either of a civil or
criminal nature, to enforce against parties affected an unconstitutional act, violating the Federal
Constitution, may be enjoined by a Federal court of equity from such action").
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federal court., 2 24 His point is equally applicable to a state's decision to litigate a case
on the merits, for a state, as a beneficiary of Eleventh Amendment protection, is
likewise under no compulsion to proceed to judgment. It is useful to recall the
language of Gunter: "[W]here a State... submits its rights for judicial determination,
it will be bound thereby ....225
A simple analogy should help to clarify this point. Imagine a boxing champion is
challenged to a bout by a young upstart fighter. The champ is not required by any of
the boxing authorities to meet this challenge; he is free to fight other challengers or
not to fight at all.226 Still, the public pressure to fight the spunky challenger is
mounting, and the champ likes his chances. If the champ wins, then under the boxing
authority's rules the challenger cannot return for a rematch, and other fighters will be
deterred from fighting a champion with so strong a record. With these thoughts in
mind, he chooses to fight but on one condition: He insists that if he is knocked out, he
not be stripped of his title as champion and the loss not be counted on his professional
record.
The inherent illegitimacy of this condition is readily apparent-the boxer may
choose not to fight, but he may not escape the consequences of fighting once he
enters the ring. By deciding to exchange blows with his opponent when he need not,
the champ submits to the authority of the referee and the decision of the judges.
So too with sovereign immunity. A state that chooses not to assert its immunity is
using the federal courts to "fight" when it need not. This is no less an invocation of
federal jurisdiction than the decision to intervene or file a proof of claim. Justice
Kennedy explained in Schacht that "like any other defendant, [the State] has the
unilateral right to block removal of the case, [thus] any appearance the State makes in
federal court may well be regarded as voluntary., 27 The same can be said when a
state does not assert immunity. It has the unilateral right to prevent the suit from going
forward, but chooses not to exercise that right. As the Creative Goldsmiths court
emphasized, when a state "affirmatively enter[s] a federal forum voluntarily to pursue
its own interest[,] it would violate the fundamental fairness of judicial process to
allow a state to proceed in federal court [while retaining full Eleventh Amendment
protection]. 2 28 Under such circumstances, states should be made to abide by the
judgment of the court as all other parties must. A state that litigates a case on the
merits in federal court instead of exercising its right unilaterally to terminate the
224 Wis. Dep't of Corr. v. Schacht, 524 U.S. 381, 395-96 (1998) (Kennedy, J., concurring).
225 Gunter v. Atil. Coast Line R.R., 200 U.S. 273, 284 (1906) (emphasis added).
226 In truth, boxing authorities often do require title-holders to fight certain contenders. To
make this analogy tighter, however, presume that the fighter has as much leeway as states do in the
federal courts context.
227 Schacht, 524 U.S. at 396 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
228 In re Creative Goldsmiths, 119 F.3d 1140, 1148 (4th Cir. 1997); see also In re Platter, 140
F.3d 676, 680 (7th Cir. 1998) ("The Eleventh Amendment does not prevent a state from entering a
federal forum voluntarily to pursue its own interest. However, if a state embarks down this route, it
cannot run back to seek Eleventh Amendment protection when it does not like the result.").
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proceeding "submits its rights for judicial determination" within the meaning of
Gunter.
There is no principled basis on which to distinguish a rule implying waiver from
states' failure to assert immunity from the well-established rules of constructive
waiver that apply when states engage in other conduct as litigants. The next section
delves deeper into the waiver-in-litigation exception to the College Savings rule. It
explains why conditioning access to the federal courts on waiver of immunity has
(implicitly) been deemed not to violate the voluntariness principle. This explanation
brings together both the theoretical and the doctrinal justifications for overturning
Ford.
C. Why a Waiver-in-Litigation Exception?
Two characteristics of the waiver-in-litigation cases distinguish them from cases
such as Parden and College Savings, which involve waivers induced by attaching
conditions to states' decisions to engage in primary conduct.229 First, the litigation
cases reflect a normative conclusion about the cost of exclusion from federal court.
The decision to forego immunity from suit in order to gain a right of access to the
federal courts (as a plaintiff, claimant, or otherwise) can be classified as voluntary
only if one concedes that the cost of exclusion from the federal courts is not
impossibly high. If the cost of exclusion were perceived as too high, then the choice
to forego immunity would be no choice at all; rather, it would be the only possible
response to the threatened sanction. Second, the waiver-in-litigation cases reveal the
doctrinal significance of the close relationship between the right waived and the
benefit conferred. The determination that waivers extracted through the litigation
process are voluntarily offered rests, in part, on the congruity of permitting states to
submit to federal jurisdiction on the condition that they relinquish their power to
revoke this submission.230 A doctrinal foundation for this analysis can be found in the
229 The exceptions noted in College Savings also involve primary conduct, but the very factors
that distinguish waiver-in-litigation from Parden-style constructive waivers also differentiate
Spending Clause or Compact Clause waivers from the Parden scenario.
230 See Creative Goldsmiths, 119 F.3d at 1148 ("When a state authorizes its officials
voluntarily to invoke federal process in a federal forum, the State thereby consents to the federal
forum's rules of procedure."). The significance of either of the factors discussed above will vary
from case to case. For example, in the bankruptcy cases, the costs of refusal to waive immunityare
comparatively high given that the federal courts have exclusivejurisdiction over such matters. Thus
the latter justification presented above-which focuses on a kind of symmetry inherent in
establishing exposure to suit as the cost of suing someone else-must do the heavy lifting. In this
respect, the Gardner Court's suggestion that, because a bankrupt estate is a kind of limited fund,
staking a claim to that fund should trigger waiver, is significant. This justification is predicated on
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case that serves as the basis for the Spending Clause exception identified by the




a. A Substantive Analysis
The Dole Court considered whether Congress could condition a state's receipt of
federal highway funds on its establishment of a minimum drinking age. 3 Writing for
the majority, Chief Justice Rehnquist explained that "[t]he offer of benefits to a state
by the United States dependent upon cooperation by the state with federal plans.. . is
not unusual. ,234 The Court noted, however, that "in some circumstances, the financial
inducement offered by Congress might be so coercive as to pass the point at which
'pressure turns into compulsion.' 2 35 The federal government could not offer the
states a benefit that they "could not refuse" on the condition that they legislate in a
certain way or waive a certain right. Such a conditional offer would strip the states of
voluntary choice.
On the facts of Dole, however, the Court ruled that "the argument as to coercion
is shown to be more rhetoric than fact., 2 36 Because "Congress ... offered relatively
the notion that there is a set of standard rules that apply within the courtroom and that such rules
should apply uniformly.
231 Coll. Sav. Bank v. Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd., 527 U.S. 666, 686
(1999) (citing South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 212 (1987)).
212 The continued vitality of the Dole holding is in doubt. One might infer from the Rehnquist
Court's recent federalism decisions, see, e.g., Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706 (1999); Printz v.
United States, 521 U.S. 898, 933 (1997) (holding unconstitutional a law requiring state law
enforcement officers to perform background checks on gun purchasers); Seminole Tribe of Florida
v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44 (1996) (discussed supra notes 1-3 and accompanying text); New York v.
United States, 505 U.S. 144, 149 (1992) (invalidating a provision of the Low-Level Radioactive
Waste Policy Act Amendments due to its unconstitutional commandeering of state legislatures),
that if Dole appeared before the Court today, the outcome would be different. See Meltzer, supra
note 149, at 1373 (noting that the "themes in Justice O'Connor's dissent in Dole resonate with
those of more recent majority opinions on federalism issues, and many have suggested, or hoped,
that Dole will be limited by a subsequent Supreme Court decision"). Then again, as the College
Savings decision made clear, Dole is still binding precedent. This article focuses on the arguments
in Dole only to underscore the contention that, as a normative matter, it is reasonable to perceive a
state's decision to litigate on the merits in federal court as a voluntary waiver of immunity. I do not
mean to imply that Dole is a perfectly stable precedent.
233 Dole, 483 U.S. at 205.
234 Id. at 210 (quoting Oklahoma v. Civil Serv. Comm'n, 330 U.S. 127, 143-44 (1947)
(internal quotation marks omitted)).
231 Id. at 211 (quoting Steward Mach. Co. v. Davis, 301 U.S. 548, 590 (1937)).236 Id.
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mild encouragement to the States to enact higher minimum drinking ages than they
would otherwise [have chosen,]... the enactment of such laws remain[ed] the
prerogative of the States not merely in theory but in fact. 23 7 The Court found that the
ultimate decision whether to accept federal funds was truly South Dakota's to make,
and thus the Court upheld the conditional grant in Dole.238
Critically, the Dole Court assessed the voluntariness of state conduct by
examining the substance of the exchange between the states and the federal
government. Underlying the Court's finding of non-coercion was the sense that
withholding the "gift" of federal funds 239 was not too harsh a sanction to impose on
states that were unwilling to legislate in accordance with federal directives.
And, indeed, this sort of subjective, normative analysis of costs has been
employed by the federal courts in their efforts to determine whether federal statutes
that establish waiver of immunity as a precondition to a grant of federal funds are
unconstitutionally coercive. For example, in Jim C. v. United States,240 the Eighth
Circuit, sitting en banc, held that the requirement that states waive immunity from suit
under section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act as a condition of receiving federal
financial assistance under the Act was not unduly coercive.241 In reaching this
conclusion, the court explained:
[T]he Arkansas Department of Education can avoid the requirements of Section 504
simply by declining federal education funds. The sacrifice of all federal education
funds, approximately $250 million or 12 per cent of the annual state education
budget... would be politically painful, but we cannot say that it compels Arkansas's
choice. The choice is up to the State: either give up federal aid to education, or agree
that the Department of Education can be sued under Section 504. We think the
Spending Clause allows Congress to present States with this sort of choice.
2 42
A group of dissenting judges rested its argument, in large part, on a different
assessment of the gravity of the costs of refusal to waive immunity:
In sum, the proportion of federal funds for education in Arkansas here placed at risk
by the federal scheme (100%), the amount of those funds (some $250,000,000), and
the difficulty of making up for the loss of those funds if the State elects not to waive
its Eleventh Amendment immunity with respect to Rehabilitation Act claims all lead
237 Id. at 211-12. Only five percent of state highway funds were at stake in Dole. Id. at 211.
23 Id. at 211-12. A similar analysis is applicable to the second exception carved out in
College Savings. The permissibility of conditioning federal consent to an interstate compact on a
waiver of immunity rests on the premise that it is not unduly coercive to put this choice to the
states. See Coll. Sav. Bank v. Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd., 527 U.S. 666, 686
(1999).
239 Coll. Say. Bank, 527 U.S. at 687.
240 235 F.3d 1079 (8th Cir. 2000) (en banc).
241 Id. at 1082.
242 Id. (citation omitted).
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to the conclusion that pressure has turned into compulsion and that the waiver given
by the State is therefore unenforceable. 143
This decision lays bare the kind of balancing that underlies the federal courts'
inquiries into what counts as coercion.
Cases in the Clark-Gunter-Gardner line reflect the same kind of assessment,
though these cases involve conditional benefits in the litigation context. They indicate
that conditioning access to the federal courts on waiver of immunity does not exact
too high a cost, and therefore the sanction of limited exclusion from the federal courts
is not inherently coercive. These cases teach that the decision to waive immunity
under these circumstances "remains the prerogative of the states not merely in theory
but in fact," 244 and so the voluntariness of the state's decision is undisturbed.
Critically, in the specific context of a constructive waiver rule which would
condition the right to litigate on the merits on waiver of immunity, the costs of
retaining immunity are actually lower than the costs of doing so in these other waiver-
in-litigation cases. For example, a state that does not wish to surrender its immunity
from suits for recoupment may not file a proof of claim in bankruptcy court. The cost
of retaining Eleventh Amendment protection under these circumstances may include
loss of the opportunity to recover debts from a private party. In the Ford setting,
however, a state wishing to retain its immunity from suit sacrifices only the
opportunity to generate state-friendly precedent in the federal courts and the political
benefits that might accompany offering a substantive defense for the conduct that led
to the filing of the lawsuit.245 The economic costs associated with foregoing
affirmative claims are not present in the Ford scenario. Thus, there is strong evidence
that conditioning the right to litigate on the merits in federal court on waiver of
immunity does not, in constitutional terms, impose too strict of a sanction on states.
b. Unconstitutional Conditions?
Notwithstanding the clear indicia from the case law that waivers extracted
through the litigation process are not coercive, the doctrine of unconstitutional
conditions provides the basis for a challenge to this conclusion. This doctrine holds
that "government may not grant a benefit on the condition that the beneficiary
surrender a constitutional right, even if the government may withhold the benefit
243 Id. at 1083 (Bowman, J., joined by Beam, Loken, and Bye, J.J., dissenting).
244 South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 211-12 (1987).
245 Public pressure might compel states to pass statutes waiving immunity in the first place.
The public-instilled with a sense that the state, like other parties, should be compelled to comply
with the law and should pay the costs that ordinarily attach to its violation-might prefer to see the
state defend itself on the merits rather than hide behind the Eleventh Amendment. State officials
who fail to direct state waiver policy in accordance with public demands for state accountability
run the risk of losing office.
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altogether. 2 46 The usual justification for the doctrine is that it limits governmental
power to elicit waivers of constitutional rights under conditions inconsistent with
voluntary choice.247 Applying the unconstitutional conditions framework to a rule
conditioning federal court access on waiver of immunity raises the following
question: Even if Congress may withhold the benefit of using the federal courts from
states altogether, may it offer federal court access to states on the condition that they
waive their constitutionally guaranteed immunity from suit?
First, the threshold question must be resolved-may states be denied access to
the federal courts altogether? The answer is yes. States have no right to litigate in
federal court. This follows from the fact that the Constitution does not require the
creation of lower federal courts.248 Article I1, Section I of the Constitution states that
"[t]he judicial power of the United States shall be vested in one supreme Court, and
in such inferior Courts as the Congress may from time to time ordain and
establish. 2 49 This permissive language reflects a tradeoff between those who felt
there should be no federal courts other than the Supreme Court and those who felt the
Constitution should require the creation of lower federal courts. 250 By leaving the
creation of inferior federal courts to Congress's discretion, the framers tabled
resolution of this difficult question. Though there has been significant debate over
Congress's power to exercise its constitutional authority to create federal courts and
then limit their jurisdiction,251 these debates proceed from the common assumption
that the constitutional plan does not mandate the establishment of lower federal courts
so long as the possibility of Supreme Court review is preserved.252 States cannot have
246 Kathleen M. Sullivan, Unconstitutional Conditions, 102 HARv. L. REV. 1413, 1415
(1988); see also Richard A. Epstein, Unconstitutional Conditions, State Power, and the Limits of
Consent, 102 HARV. L. REV. 4,6-7 (1988) ("In its canonical form, this doctrine holds that even if
a state has absolute discretion to grant or deny a privilege or a benefit, it cannot grant the privilege
subject to conditions that improperly 'coerce,' 'pressure,' or 'induce' the waiver of constitutional
rights.").
141 See Sullivan, supra note 246, at 1456 (describing unconstitutional conditions as "patrolling
the elusive border between coercion and voluntary exchange").
141 See generally RiCHARD H. FALLON, JR. ET AL., HART AND WECHSLER's THE FEDERAL
COURTs AND THE FEDERAL SYsTEM 348-87 (4th ed. 1996) (discussing the scope of Congress's
power to control federal jurisdiction).
249 U.S. CONST. art. II, § I (emphasis added).
250 See HART & WECHSLER, supra note 248, at 348 (discussing the so-called "Madisonian
Compromise").
211 Compare Akhil Reed Amar, The Two- Tiered Structure ofthe Judiciary Act of1789, 138
U. PA. L. REV. 1499 (1990), and Akhil Reed Amar, A Neo-Federalist View of Article IIT:
Separating the Two Tiers of Federal Jurisdiction, 65 B.U. L. REV. 205 (1985) (suggesting that the
Constitution requires either original or appellate federal jurisdiction in certain classes of cases),
with Daniel J. Meltzer, The History and Structure ofArticle III, 138 U. PA. L. REV. 1569 (1990)
(defending the conventional view that congressional control of federal courtjurisdiction is broader
than Amar suggests).
... But see Michael G. Collins, Article III Cases, State Court Duties, and the Madisonian
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a constitutional right of access to courts that need not exist.
The next step in a conventional unconstitutional conditions analysis would be to
ask whether Congress may condition the availability of federal courts on waiver of
constitutionally protected rights. To put a finer point on it, the next step in such an
analysis would be to argue that this sort of conditional grant of access to the federal
courts is impermissible. It would be a mistake, however, to concede that the proposed
rule (and waiver-in-litigation generally) is constitutionally suspect simply because
unconstitutional conditions analysis raises that possibility.
For starters, the Supreme Court has not applied unconstitutional conditions
doctrine with any consistency.253 It is difficult to know when the unconstitutional
conditions framework will persuade the Court and when it will not.254 In particular,
this doctrine is absent from the Supreme Court's assessments of the problems
associated with constructive waiver.255 As noted earlier, Justice Scalia's opinion in
College Savings Bank expresslypreserves the possibility of conditioning the federal
government's grant of a "gift or gratuity" on a state's waiver of immunity.256 Such
conditional grants are irreconcilable with the unconstitutional conditions argument,
257
yet the Court unequivocally kept this avenue toward waiver open. Supreme Court
precedent thus suggests that the applicability of the unconstitutional conditions model
to analysis of constructive waiver is highly dubious.
The academic literature on unconstitutional conditions offers further reason to
Compromise, 1995 WIS. L. REV. 39, 45 (questioning the "force of the permissive language
regarding the creation of lower federal courts"). Professor Collins' approach is in tension with the
plain language of Article III and by the historical information suggesting that this language did, in
fact, reflect a compromise between those committed to making the creation of inferior federal
courts constitutionally mandatory and those altogether opposed to their creation.
"' See Sullivan, supra note 246, at 1416 ("As applied,.., the doctrine of unconstitutional
conditions is riven with inconsistencies."); Cass R. Sunstein, Why the Unconstitutional Conditions
Doctrine is an Anachronism (with Particular Reference to Religion, Speech, and Abortion), 70
B.U. L. REV. 593,594 (1990) ("The various puzzles produced bythe [unconstitutional conditions]
doctrine have created considerable doctrinal confusion.").
114 See Sullivan, supra note 246, at 1417 (detailing the Supreme Court's haphazard use ofthe
doctrine and remarking "[n]o wonder the lower courts divide in deciding identical unconstitutional
conditions challenges").
215 None of the discussions in the waiver-in-litigation cases conceptualizes the problem with
such implied waivers as one of unconstitutional conditions. Cf id. ("[T]he Court has ... rejected
every federalism-based challenge to conditions on federal subsidies since the New Deal.").
256 Coll. Sav. Bank v. Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd., 527 U.S. 666, 687
(1999).
257 Indeed, Dole itself cannot be reconciled with the unconstitutional conditions argument. See
Sullivan, supra note 246, at 1501 (discussing Dole and arguing that "[i]t is perhaps the worst
mistake in current unconstitutional conditions analysis that such flagrant instances of rights-
pressuring intent have been immunized on the theory that the government has committed no
coercive act"). The decision in Dole contributes to the strong sense that the constitutionality of
waiver-in-litigation rules will not, ultimately, turn on application of unconstitutional conditions
doctrine.
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doubt that the doctrine could effectively defeat these kinds of waiver-in-litigation
rules.2" 8 Many scholars have pointed out that the question of whether a given
condition unconstitutionally coerces a waiver of rights turns decisively on the
selection of the baseline from which to assess the beneficiary's decision to waive.
Professor Sunstein, for example, has explained that "generating the appropriate
baseline from which to distinguish [permissible] subsidies from [impermissible]
penalties is exceptionally difficult."2" 9 In addressing this difficulty, Professor Epstein
explained that "[w]hen the baseline gives a right to the government, government may
condition the benefits that it imposes. When it gives the right to the individual, then
the government's extraction of a concession amounts to impermissible coercion."
26
Without guidance in the process of selecting the baseline from which to assess a
waiver of rights, the unconstitutional conditions analysis is inconclusive.
The baseline-identifying quandary complicates analysis of the waiver-in-litigation
rule at stake in Ford. Is the appropriate baseline from which to measure the
voluntariness of a state's decision to waive immunity determined by examining what,
as a constitutional matter, Congress could have done in structuring federal court
jurisdiction? If so, then perhaps there is nothing unconstitutionally coercive about
providing conditional access to the federal courts rather than refusing to provide
federal courts at all. If, however, the appropriate baseline is defined in light of modern
federal court practice, then changing course and imposing new demands on state
litigants appears more troubling.
A more sensible (and, hopefully, more conclusive) analysis would focus on the
substantive concerns underlying the unconstitutional conditions inquiry instead of
using the doctrine, as it is all-too-often used, as a misleading shorthand for them.26'
"[W]hat is necessary," Professor Sunstein has explained, "is a highly particular,
constitutionally-centered model of reasons: an approach that asks whether, under the
provision at issue, the government has constitutionally sufficient reasons for affecting
... Professor Sunstein has gone so far as to argue that the unconstitutional conditions doctrine
should be "abandoned." See Sunstein, supra note 253, at 594. He stresses that "[t]he Constitution
offers no general protection against the imposition of penalties on the exercise of rights." Id. at
603. 259 Id. at 602; see also Epstein, supra note 246, at 13 ("[Tlhe greatest difficulty with the
coercion question is to identify the appropriate baseline against which the possibly coercive effects
of government action may be evaluated.") (citing Seth F. Kreimer, Allocational Sanctions: The
Problem of Negative Rights in Positive State, 132 U. PA. L. REv. 1293, 1352 (1984)); Sullivan,
supra note 246, at 1436 (noting that "the characterization of a condition as a 'penalty' or as a
'nonsubsidy' depends on the baseline from which one measures").
260 Epstein, supra note 246, at 13 (citing Seth F. Kreimer, Allocational Sanctions: The
Problem of Negative Rights in Positive State, 132 U. PA. L. REv. 1293, 1352 (1984)).
261 See Sunstein, supra note 253, at 606 ("Whether the greater power includes the lesser, and
whether there is a legal obstacle to an apparently free choice, depend on a reading of the
constitutional provision at issue, not on shorthand phrases.").
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constitutionally protected interests., 262 It is just this kind of substantive analysis that
took place in Dole and that underlies the Court's conclusions in cases such as Clark,
Gunter, and Gardner.
Applied to the constructive waiver rule eschewed in Ford, the question is
whether there is sufficient justification for the federal government's decision to
burden states' exercise of their Eleventh Amendment rights.2 63 I believe there is. The
burden on states' Eleventh Amendment rights implicated by conditioning federal
court access on waiver is minimal and is carefully crafted to remedy a particular
injustice. The burden is minimal because the proposed rule would not contract the set
of cases in which states may enjoy the protection of the Eleventh Amendment, should
they choose to invoke it. While the rule I recommend does compel states to decide
earlier in the litigation process whether to exercise their immunity, it does not make
this immunity unavailable in any particular case. In addition, this rule is justified
because it is designed to preclude conduct by state-defendants that imposes great
costs on private litigants and on the federal courts. As discussed above,264 delayed
presentation of an Eleventh Amendment defense essentially structures federal court
litigation such that a private citizen cannot win. It wastes judicial resources and
undermines the integrity of the federal courts by transforming them into bodies
capable of issuing binding judgments only to the extent that they are beneficial to
state interests. Furthermore, a rule transforming Eleventh Amendment immunity into
a "use it or lose it" objection-to be raised before trial, or not at all-is targeted
carefully to resolve a particular problem; it is not susceptible to challenges of over-
inclusiveness.265 The proposed rule would, on a case-by-case basis, trade access to
federal court in exchange for consent to be bound by the court's judgment. The
waiver is confined to each specific case in which the state enjoys the benefit offered
by the federal government.
266
One final complication merits attention before leaving the unconstitutional
conditions analysis behind. Conditioning state access to the federal courts on waiver
of immunity seems to treat states differently from other litigants-it seemingly would
require states, but no other parties, to waive constitutionally-guaranteed rights as a
262 Id. at 595; see also id. at 608 ("[T]he question is whether the measure at issue interferes
with a constitutional right, properly characterized, and, if so, whether the government has sufficient
justification for its interference.").
263 See id. at 609 (asking whether "government ha[s] available to it distinctive
justifications... because of the context in which the relevant burden is imposed").264 See supra Part IM1.A.
265 See infra Part IV.C.2; cf South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 207 (1987) (noting that
"conditions on federal grants might be illegitimate if they are unrelated 'to the federal interest [at
stake].' (quoting Massachusetts v. United States, 435 U.S. 444, 461 (1978) (plurality opinion))).
Cf Jim C. v. United States, 235 F.2d 1079, 1081 (8th Cir. 2000) (en banc) ("The
acceptance of funds by one state agency.., leaves unaffected both other state agencies and the
State as a whole.... By accepting funds offered to an agency, the State waives its immunity only
with regard to the individual agency that receives them.").
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condition of litigating in federal court. Perhaps the unconstitutional nature of the
condition lies in the unequal treatment of state and private litigants.
This analysis, too, raises a confounding question regarding identification of the
appropriate baseline. What does it mean to treat parties before the federal courts
"equally"? On the one hand, equal treatment might entail requiring all parties to raise
immunities or jurisdictional arguments, including Eleventh Amendment immunity,
before trial begins or not at all. From this perspective, the proposed rule treats states
no differently from other litigants. On the other hand, equal treatment might be
construed differently. It might require non-interference with the constitutional rights
of all parties before the federal courts, regardless of what this bundle of rights may be.
Under this analysis, requiring states, but not private litigants, to waive Eleventh
Amendment immunity as a condition of litigating on the merits seems problematic.267
In this instance, however, the choice of baselines proves to be an illusory
difficulty. For regardless of which baseline is selected, a rule conditioning the right to
litigate on the merits on waiver of immunity treats states as all other litigants are
treated. It is true that this rule requires only those entities that enjoy Eleventh
Amendment immunity to waive it before proceeding as defendants in federal court. In
this narrow sense, states are treated differently from private litigants who, of course,
enjoy no such immunity and, therefore, are in no position to waive it. However, all
litigants are required to waive certain constitutional rights as a condition of
proceeding as defendants in federal court. For example, a litigant with a valid claim
that a federal court lacks personal jurisdiction over her is not permitted to litigate on
the merits and then raise this argument at the appellate level if she is unsuccessful in
district court.268 The decision not to raise claims sounding in personal jurisdiction at
the trial level implies waiver.
The rules of personal jurisdiction are constitutional in nature269 and therefore
267 One could argue that states are entitled not simply to equal treatment in this context, but to
preferential treatment. Justice Scalia explained in College Savings that "[i]n the sovereign-
immunity context... 'evenhandedness' between individuals and States is not to be expected:
'[T]he constitutional role of the States sets them apart ... ' Coll. Sav. Bank v. Fla. Prepaid
Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd., 527 U.S. 666,685-86 (1999) (quoting Welch v. Tex. Dep't of
Highways and Pub. Transp., 483 U.S. 468,477 (1987)). This statement, however, is dictum and
was meant specifically to distinguish states from private citizens with regard to "market
participant" doctrine.
161 FED. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(l) ("A defense of lack of jurisdiction over the person, improper
venue, insufficiency of process, or insufficiency of service of process is waived ... if it is neither
made by motion under this rule nor included in a responsive pleading or an amendment thereof.").
Indeed, it is exactlythis sort of manipulative behavior that concerned the authors of the ALl Study
discussed supra Part III.B.269 The Due Process Clause requires that a defendant "have certain minimum contacts with [a
judicial forum] such that the maintenance of the suit does not offend 'traditional notions of fair
play and substantial justice."' International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945)
(quoting Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457,463 (1940)); see also id. at 319 (discussing'the fair and
orderly administration of the laws which it was the purpose of the due process clause to insure").
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merit protection from coerced waiver just as states' rights under the Eleventh
Amendment deserve such protection. Private litigants, however, are regularly
compelled to choose between retaining their immunity from suits in which the federal
courts lack personal jurisdiction and litigating on the merits. Similarly, as to questions
of subject matter jurisdiction, litigants are not permitted to try their luck in trial court
and raise jurisdictional defenses at the appellate stage. This is avoided by not simply
allowing but requiring the federal courts to raise defects in subject matterjurisdiction
sua sponte. 270 The permissibility of conditioning private parties' right to litigate on the
merits in federal court on a waiver of their constitutionally-protected immunity from
suits in which there is a defect in the court's personal jurisdiction creates the strong
implication that it is likewise permissible to condition states' rights to litigate on the
merits on waiver of Eleventh Amendment immunity.
27 1
This analysis shows that unconstitutional conditions doctrine is not an
impediment to a rule that would make Eleventh Amendment immunity a "use it or
lose it" defense. The doctrine has had no bearing on waiver-in-litigation questions to
this point and there is little reason to believe that it will suddenly assume a prominent
role in the Court's waiver-in-litigation jurisprudence. Moreover, because the
unconstitutional conditions slant on the voluntariness principle raises serious
questions about the constitutional validity of basic rules of federal court procedure in
the personal jurisdiction context, it is exceedingly unlikely that it would be applied in
this context.
270 FED. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3) ("Whenever it appears by suggestion of the parties or otherwise
that the court lacks jurisdiction of the subject matter, the courtshall dismiss the action.") (emphasis
added); Ins. Corp. of Ir. v. Compagnie des Bauxites des Guinee, 456 U.S. 694,704 (1982) (noting
that "even an appellate court may review sua sponte" a defect in the court's subject matter
jurisdiction). Of course, a party could still tryto engage in strategic litigation by staying silent with
respect to a defense that goes to the subject matter jurisdiction of the court, knowing all the while
that if she loses at trial, she can still assert this defense at the appellate level. Nevertheless, the rule
requiring federal courts to consider such issues sua sponte should dramatically reduce the number
of cases in which this can be done successfully.
271 One might argue that Eleventh Amendment rights merit greater protection than the Due
Process rights at stake in the personal jurisdiction context. See supra note 267. But this argument is
undermined (though not entirely neutralized) by the evident lack of special treatment of sovereign
immunity relative to other constitutional rights with respect to waiver-in-litigation. While it might
not follow ineluctably from the permissibility of waiver of Due Process rights during litigation that
waiver of Eleventh Amendment rights may similarly be induced, the Supreme Court's treatment of
sovereign immunity in cases such as Clark and Gardner does not permit the conclusion that
Eleventh Amendment rights are inviolate in a way that Due Process rights are not.
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2. Germaneness
The second key factor contributing to the permissibility of waivers in litigation is
the close relationship between the conditioned benefit and the right waived. As noted
above, Chief Justice Rehnquist's majority opinion in Dole established that
"conditions on federal grants might be illegitimate if they are unrelated to the federal
interests [at stake]." 272 Thus, for example, the federal government presumably could
not condition a grant of Title IX funds on a waiver of immunity from suits brought
under the Americans with Disabilities Act. However, demanding a waiver of
immunity from suits brought under Title IX would be permissible.273 The waiver
must be related to the benefit conferred in order to be valid.274
The germaneness requirement sets a limit on Congress's ability to use its power
in one sphere in order to control conduct in another. Even when the non-coercion
requirement is satisfied, if the link between the benefit conferred and the right waived
is too attenuated, the conditional grant will not pass muster.
In the waiver-in-litigation cases, the waivers extracted from states are undeniably
germane to the benefit granted in exchange. In return for the benefit of having a
federal court adjudicate a dispute (whether it is one in which the state seeks
affirmative relief or in which the state is a defendant), the state must submit to the
authority of that court. As the Creative Goldsmiths court acknowledged, the link
between invocation of federal process and consent to that court's ultimate authority is
nothing short of "fundamental. 275 It is revealing to recall, at this juncture, that the
waiver-in-litigation cases do not apply the kind of clear statement rules that dominated
the rest of constructive waiver jurisprudence during the period between Parden and
College Savings Bank. As suggested earlier, it seems likely that the reason such rules
never evolved in this context is that there is something obvious about the relationship
between invoking and submitting to jurisdiction. This relationship is a structural
feature of our system of courts, so no special warning is necessary to inform states that
272 South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 207 (1987) (citing Massachusetts v. United States,
435 U.S. 444, 461 (1978) (plurality opinion) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
273 See, e.g., Litman v. George Mason University, 186 F.3d 544, 547 (4th Cir. 1999) (holding
that George Mason University, an arm of the State of Virginia, had waived sovereign immunity
from suits brought under Title IX by accepting Title IX funding from the federal government).
274 Of course, this begs the question-how germane is germane enough? The federal courts
are struggling with this question. In Jim C., for example, the Eighth Circuit, sitting en banc, upheld
the constitutionality of section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, which conditions the grant of federal
education funds on a waiver of immunity from suits under that provision. In reaching this
conclusion, the court noted that "[t]he acceptance of funds by one state agency.., leaves
unaffected both other state agencies and the State as a whole.... By accepting funds offered to an
agency, the State waives its immunity only with regard to the individual agency that receives
them." Jim C. v. United States, 235 F.2d 1079, 1081 (8th Cir. 2000) (en banc).
275 Schlossberg v. Maryland (In re Creative Goldsmiths of Washington, D.C., Inc.), 119 F.3d
1140, 1147 (4th Cir. 1997).
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it will frame their experience when they opt to litigate when they need not.
The different strands of case law that offer insight into how voluntary choice is
defined suggest that a rule establishing waiver of Eleventh Amendment immunity as a
user fee for the federal courts is within constitutional limits. College Savings
explicitly contemplates the bargaining away of sovereign immunity, and the waiver-
in-litigation cases, as well as the rules governing personal jurisdiction, demonstrate
that federal court access may be part of the bargain. From this perspective, then, the
voluntariness principle poses no obstacle to a constructive waiver rule in the Ford
scenario.
This article will conclude by examining one last element of the voluntariness
question-the requirement that state law determine which officials are authorized to
waive immunity. It will suggest two possible schemes for structuring the states'
conditional right of access to the federal courts and consider the complications
associated with each.
D. Implementation and the State Authorization Difficulty
A rule conditioning states' access to the federal courts on waiver of immunity
must coexist with state laws that limit the authority of the officials responsible for
representing states in the federal courts. The Ford Court emphasized that when
inferring a waiver of immunity from the conduct of state officials, "[t]he
issue.., becomes one of their power under state law to do so. ''276 A fundamental
feature of the states' sovereign power is the authority to control the behavior of state
officials, which includes the authority to define the class of cases in which a given
official may act on behalf of the state.277 The challenge, then, is to negotiate the
176 Ford Motor Co. v. Dep't of Treasury of Ind., 323 U.S. 459,467 (1945); id. (noting that a
waiver is effective only "if it is within the power of the administrative and executive officers of
Indiana to waive the state's immunity").277 Cf City of St. Louis v. Praprotnik, 485 U.S. 112, 124 (1988) (plurality opinion) (citing
Pembaur v. City of Cincinnati, 475 U.S. 469, 483 (1986)) (holding that identification of
policymaking officials for purposes of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 liability is a question of state law). The
Praprotnik plurality explained that if courts and juries were permitted to determine which state
officials were "policymakers," then states would be unable to structure their conduct so as to avoid
liability due to the unpredictability of these determinations. Id. at 124 n. 1. But there is little reason
to believe that similar difficulties will accompany an implied waiver scheme like the one rejected
in Ford. A state should be able to craft a simple procedure through which district attorneys obtain
the authorization of higher-ups before litigating on the merits in federal court. Moreover, in
contrast to the Praprotnik scenario, it will be perfectly clear what class of conduct triggers waiver.
Though the Praprotnik case involved an interpretation of section 1983 and did not raise
constitutional questions, it raised issues regarding the permissibility of depriving states of the
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delicate relationship between federal rules setting conditions on use of the federal
courts--conditions that have implications for sovereign rights-and state rules
governing the import of state officials' behavior.
As discussed in Part II.C, this dynamic of the waiver question, like so many
others, is best understood in terms of the voluntariness principle. For even if it is
conceded-on the basis of the arguments elaborated earlier in this Part-that a
sovereign state can be made to waive its immunity as a condition of litigating on the
merits in federal courts without threatening the voluntariness of its choice, this is a far
cry from establishing that a waiver inferred from the conduct of a perhaps-
unauthorized state employee is likewise voluntary. If the organizing principle of
constructive waiver is to be properly taken into account, it is necessary to face up to
the problem of ultra vires waiver.
This section explores two options available to Congress and the courts as a means
of conditioning federal court access on waiver of immunity. Neither suggestion
imposes significant constraints on the ability of states to limit the authority of the
officials who act on their behalf and, as a corollary, both pass muster under the
voluntariness analysis.
1. Presumed Authorization
One possibility would be for Congress to pass a law under which a state that
litigates on the merits at trial waives its Eleventh Amendment immunity. The federal
courts would then presume that state officials who are authorized to act on the state's
behalf in federal court are also empowered by the state to consent to federal
jurisdiction. With a rule of "presumed authorization" in place, states that do not want
officials unilaterally to waive immunity will take pains to control the conduct of their
attorneys and to make clear to the federal courts that their attorneys lack the authority
to waive immunity. With the consequences of litigating on the merits made perfectly
clear, there is little reason for concern that a state will waive immunity involuntarily.
Critically, a number of federal courts have already employed this technique in
other waiver-in-litigation contexts. In 1998, for example, the Seventh Circuit
considered whether the State of Indiana had waived its immunity from suit when a
representative of the Indiana Division of Family and Children Services (DFCS)
initiated an adversary proceeding against a party in bankruptcy court. 78 The State
contended that "because the Indiana General Assembly has not expressly waived its
power to control the meaning of delegations of sovereign authority. But cf Lawrence County v.
Lead-Deadwood Sch. Dist. No. 40-1, 469 U.S. 256, 269-70 (1985) (holding that "concerns of
federalism" do not prevent the federal government from conditioning a grant of funds to local
governments on their being used for certain purposes over the objections of the sovereign state). In
this case, state power to control the decision-making processes within subdivisions was preempted
by federal law.
28 In re Platter, 140 F.3d 676, 678 (7th Cir. 1998).
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argument, however, holding that "[b]ecause a state voluntarily chooses to enter a
bankruptcy case when it initiates an adversary proceeding ... [it] removes itself from
the Eleventh Amendment's protection by starting one. 0' Similarly, in Koehler v.
Iowa College Student Aid Commission,2s ' a bankruptcy court explained:
The Attorney General filed a counterclaim seeking affirmative relief in the form ofa
judgment.... [Iowa law] authorizes the Attorney General to bring suit in federal
court whenever the state's interests are at stake. It follows from [this] that, to the
extent that such affirmative conduct constitutes a waiver under Eleventh
Amendment law, the Attorney General is authorized to constructively waive Iowa's
Eleventh Amendment immunity by bringing a claim in federal court.28 2
And, perhaps most significantly, in Gardner v. New Jersey," (which was
decided a mere two years after Ford Motor Company), the Supreme Court said
nothing about whether the state official was authorized under state law to waive
Eleventh Amendment immunity.284 The Court simply assumed that the state official's
authority to represent the State in litigation included the authority to waive
immunity. 85 Thus, the practice of classifying certain conduct as waiver-inducing-
and then inferring from the fact that a state has authorized an official to engage in this
conduct that the state has also authorized the official to waive immunity-is hardly
286foreign to the federal courts.
Moreover, as mentioned above, a number of lower courts have already adopted
287this approach in Spending Clause cases. These courts have held that state
acceptance of federal funds that are granted on condition of waiver of immunity
qualifies as consent to suit. They have arrived at this conclusion without considering
210 Id. at 679.
"' 204 B.R. 210 (D. Minn. 1997).
282 Id. at 218 n.13 (emphasis added).
113 329 U.S. 565 (1947).
284 Id. at 573.
283 Id. at 573-74.
286 This approach bears some resemblance to the rules of apparent authority from agency law.
See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 8 cmt. (a) (1992) ("Apparent authority results from a
manifestation by a person that another is his agent"); id. § 8 cmt. (d) ("[W]hen one tells a third
person that another is authorized to make a contract of a certain sort, and the other, on behalf of the
principal, enters into such a contract... the principal becomes immediately a contracting party,
with both rights and liabilities to the third person."). It also borrows from a maxim from the
criminal law context which teaches that an individual "is presumed to intend the natural and
probable consequences of [his] acts." WAYNE R. LAFAvE AND AusTN F. SCOTr, JR., CRIMINAL
LAW § 3.5(0 (2d ed. 1986); cf Wis. Dep't of Corr. V. Schacht, 542 U.S. 381, 393 (1998)
(Kennedy, J., concurring) ("By electing to remove, the State created the difficult problem
confronted... here. This is the situation in which law usually says a party must accept the
consequences of its own acts.").
287 See supra note 148 (citing cases).
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this approach in Spending Clause cases.217 These courts have held that state
acceptance of federal funds that are granted on condition of waiver of immunity
qualifies as consent to suit. They have arrived at this conclusion without considering
whether state law expressly authorizes the fund-accepting officials to waive Eleventh
Amendment rights. That the officials were authorized to accept the funds (themselves
unambiguously conditioned on waiver of immunity) was deemed a sufficiently
unequivocal expression of intent to waive.
Further support for this approach can be found in Justice Kennedy's Schacht
concurrence. There, he explained that "[i]f the States know or have reason to expect
that removal will constitute a waiver, then it is easy enough to presume that an
attorney authorized to represent the State can bind it to thejurisdiction of the federal
court (for Eleventh Amendment purposes) by the consent to removal." '288 Justice
Kennedy insisted that "the absence of specific authorization [to waive immunity] is
not an insuperable obstacle to adopting a rule of waiver in every case where the State,
through its attorneys, consents to removal. 289 Only if "it were demonstrated that a
federal rule finding waiver of the Eleventh Amendment when the State consents to
removal would put States at some unfair tactical disadvantage" should courts not
embrace the waiver rule.290 As Justice Kennedy himself acknowledged, such
consequences are to be doubted.29' And as this article has attempted to show, there is
reason to doubt such dire consequences in the Ford context as well.292
Notwithstanding the robust support from these different waiver cases for the
notion that federal courts may presume authorization of state officials to waive
immunity, it is still possible to object to this scheme on the ground that it is unduly
287 See supra note 148 (citing cases).
... Wis. Dep't of Corr. v. Schacht, 524 U.S. 381, 397 (1998) (Kennedy, J., concurring)
(emphasis added). Though Justice Kennedy addressed the problems associated with raising
sovereign immunity for the first time on appeal, he restricted his proposal to removal cases, noting
that "the State's consent amounted to a direct invocation of thejurisdiction of the federal courts."
Id. (emphasis added); see supra Part Ill.B.2. In light of the arguments raised in Part IV.B, there
should not be a distinction between the removal cases and the Fordscenario. See supra notes 213-
28 and accompanying text.
289 Schacht, 524 U.S. at 397 (Kennedy, J., concurring).290 Id. at 397-98.
291 Id. at 398.
292 Indeed, this assumption-that it is not unfair to bind litigants to the conduct of their
attorneys-already controls with respect to private individuals. See, e.g., Home Port Rentals, Inc. v.
Ruben, 957 F.2d 126, 133 (4th Cir. 1992) (holding that where an attomeyhad apparent authorityto
act on the clients' behalf, consent to the agreement into which the attorney entered was binding on




permissive of ultra vires waiver. For even if it could be agreed that it is desirable to
create strong incentives for states to monitor the behavior of their agents, one could
still contend that when these incentives threaten to appropriate core elements of state
sovereign power-such as the authority to determine who speaks on the state's
behalf-their constitutional validity remains in doubt.293
Here, too, an analogy to the personal jurisdiction context suggests a response to
the objection. The cases reflect no such rigorous protection for the constitutional
rights of private litigants-which may be waived by attorneys, so long as there is
apparent authority to do so, even if the client ultimately has not authorized the waiver.
If an attorney makes an appearance in federal court on her client's behalf, for
example, and neglects to object to that court's exercise of personal jurisdiction over
her client, then the client's right to contest jurisdiction on Due Process grounds is
waived. This is true even if the attorney has expressly been instructed to file a motion
challenging the court's jurisdiction. By investing the attorney with apparent authority
to proceed on her behalf in federal court, a client implicitly authorizes the attorney to
waive even constitutionally-rooted objections to the court's jurisdiction. 294
2. A Certification Requirement
If the courts were to deem the scheme outlined above too permissive of ultra vires
waiver, an alternative approach is available. The federal courts might perform a
gatekeeping function at the outset of suits involving state-defendants. Before
permitting trial on the merits to move forward, a federal court would determine
whether a properly authorized state actor wishes to waive Eleventh Amendment
immunity. A state wishing to proceed to trial on the merits would have to certify, with
reference to its "Constitution, statutes and decisions," that it consented to federal
293 f-4(90(hligta
Cf Office of Personnel Mgmt. v. Richmond, 496 U.S. 414,432-34(1990) (holding that
the federal government could not be estopped from enforcing laws regarding disability benefits
notwithstanding a private party's reasonable reliance on incorrect representations made by federal
agents); Monell v. Dep't of Social Serv. of the City of New York, 436 U.S. 658, 658 (1978)
(declining to treat local governments like private principals and to establish full respondeat superior
liability for the conduct of their agents). Both of these cases suggest that the relationship between
government and its agents differs from principal-agent relationships involving private parties.
However, the circumstances of these cases were sufficiently different from the waiver-in-litigation
scenario so as to suggest the inappropriateness of borrowing from their reasoning. In both
Richmond and Monell, the difficulty of supervising the conduct of government officials seems far
greater than is the case here. In fact, demanding that state attorneys keep apprised of state policy
regarding waiver of immunity would seem to be a very basic element of internal management
within a state Attorney General's office.294 As discussed above, there might be important differences between the immunity from suit
that private litigants enjoy as an outgrowth of their Due Process rights and the immunity states
enjoy under the Eleventh Amendment. See supra notes 267, 271. The point is simply that there is
clearly no categorical prohibition against ultra vires waiver of constitutional rights; instead, the
question of whether such waiver is permitted entails a balancing of competing factors.
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jurisdiction. 295 A federal statute would bar the court from exercising jurisdiction over
cases involving states that are unwilling to forego their immunity from suit. Such a
statute might read as follows:
(a) The jurisdiction of the federal courts shall not extend to any suit brought against
a state unless the state has expressly consented to the jurisdiction of the federal
courts;
(b) Such consent shall be communicated through an affidavit and memorandum of
law signed by the state attorney general or the attorney general's delegate certifying
that state law authorizes the presenting official to waive Eleventh Amendment
immunity.
This approach bears some similarity to one under which federal courts would be
required to consider the Eleventh Amendment defense sua sponte.296 It differs,
however, in that, under this scheme, without a certification from the state that waiver
is permitted, a federal statute-not the Eleventh Amendment-will formally bar the
suit from the federal courts. This avoids (to some extent) entanglement with the
question of whether federal courts should, sua sponte, consider the applicability of
Eleventh Amendment immunity, a question complicated by the Clark Court's
teaching that sovereign immunity is a "personal privilege. ,297 Under the certification
procedure, federal courts would not be called upon to decide a question of
constitutional law: Does the defendant enjoy immunity under the Eleventh
Amendment? Instead, courts would address a statutory matter: Has the state followed
the statutory procedures necessary to submit to the court's jurisdiction? The state,
rather than the court, would determine whether the Eleventh Amendment barred the
suit.
Because, under this scheme, the default rule presumes that officials are not
authorized to waive immunity, it falls neatly in line with cases such as Edelman
which require waivers to be express and unequivocal.298 This approach would all but
eliminate the possibility of delayed presentation of the immunity defense. Because the
federal courts would be briefed on the state law governing the official's authority to
waive immunity, the probability of an unauthorized waiver is low.
This scheme would not be without complications. First, it would require federal
courts to apply state law every time a state wished to litigate on the merits. This would
entail application of relatively unfamiliar precedent and statutes. Second, the
possibility of ultra vires waiver persists even under this scheme. For there might be
cases in which a state Attorney General is able to persuade a federal court that she has
the authority to waive immunity when she actually does not. And the state might then
295 Ford Motor Co. v. Dep't of Treasury of State of id., 323 U.S. 459, 467 (1945).
296 See, e.g., Lawner, supra note 150, at 1282-88.
297 Clark v. Barnard, 108 U.S. 436, 447 (1883).
291 See Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 673 (1974); see also, e.g., Coll. Sav. Bank v. Fla.
Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd., 527 U.S. 666, 680 (1999).
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appear at the appellate stage and insist on its Eleventh Amendment rights.
Neither of these objections, however, stands up to scrutiny. First, the necessity of
federal courts applying state law in these cases does not involve a modification of
existing law. The requirement of consulting state law to answer the question of
official authorization is, in fact, expressly commanded by Ford Motor Company.299
So, while the certification requirement might increase the frequency with which the
federal courts interpret state law, it does not represent a categorical doctrinal
change.300 Moreover, with this procedure in place, there is reason to believe that
federal courts would receive more effective guidance from the state in assessing
whether state law in fact authorizes waiver in the case at hand.
As to the problem of ultra vires waiver, it should be emphasized that with the
certification procedure in place, the state's argument for a late-stage claim of
immunity is at its weakest. For starters, the federal court will have already been
persuaded that state law in fact authorizes a waiver of immunity, so there is reason to
question the substantive basis for the state's claim on appeal. This is not to say that
federal courts will never get questions of state law wrong, only that there should be a
heavy burden on the state to prove that the court actually erred.3 ' 1 Further, the
erection of a precisely defined procedure for waiver of Eleventh Amendment
protection creates opportunities for careful state oversight of official conduct. With
such procedures in place, a state's failure to monitor the conduct of its attorneys
begins to appear grossly negligent, and a justification for offering the state a second
chance to assert immunity seems lacking.
A further objection might be made, from the opposite vantage point, that this
certification procedure would prove time consuming and costly. It establishes an
elaborate procedural safeguard to protect states from conduct that they should
arguably be able to control on their own. Whether it is worthwhile for the federal
courts to be so zealously protective of states' Eleventh Amendment rights when
similar protections are not afforded private citizens' constitutional rights and when
states might fairly be expected to offer this protection on their own is subject to
debate.30 2
299 Ford Motor Co., 323 U.S. at 467.
300 If addressing these questions of state law proved too burdensome, the Court might certifythe
matter to the highest court of the relevant state.
301 An additional complication might arise if the state came forward at the appellate stage and
contended not that the federal court had ered in its analysis of state law in determining that there has
been an effective waiver of immunity, but instead that state law or policy had simply changed, and
that, for example, a new statute had been passed manifesting the sovereign state's unwillingness to
submit to suit in cases of the sort before the court. Of course, a "change of heart" is inadequate to
salvage a private individual's constitutional rights once they have been waived, so one might question
whether states should be treated differently. A fairer approach would apply the state law in effect when
the case was initially filed.
302 Both of the models described above for securing binding waivers of state sovereign immunity
have clear application outside of the waiver-in-litigation context. The "presumed authorization"model
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V. CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court's sharp contraction of constructive waiver in College Savings
Bank seems not to have extended to the federal courts' waiver-in-litigation
jurisprudence. The fundamental principle of Eleventh Amendment waiver doctrine-
only voluntary waivers are valid-does not require waivers elicited through the litigation
process to be viewed with skepticism. This is true in part because the cost of exclusion
from federal court under these circumstances seems low (and thus a state might
reasonably be expected to forego this benefit in order to retain its immunity from suit)
and, perhaps more significantly, because the requirement of full submission to the
binding authority of the federal courts seems uniquely symmetrical with the privilege of
allowing states to employ the federal courts to vindicate their rights.
The odd kink in waiver-in-litigation jurisprudence which permits states to raise the
sovereign immunity defense on appeal seems to reflect a kind of lapse in the Supreme
Court's concentration on the fundamental fairness of this symmetrical bargain-faimess
that has repeatedly been recognized by the federal courts in the waiver-in-litigation
cases. That states may litigate on the merits without any risk of adverse consequences
cannot be reconciled, as the American Law Institute put it, with "sound judicial
administration."30 3 This kink might easily be ironed out of constructive waiver
jurisprudence simply by bringing the law relating to this issue more in line with the other
waiver-in-litigation cases. As demonstrated above, this can be accomplished without
running a grave risk of ultra vires waiver and thus without threatening the voluntariness
of the states' conduct.
borrows from established federal court practice in Spending Clause cases. The many examples of
federal courts finding waivers of immunity by way of a state official's acceptance of federal funds
without first inquiring whether the officials receiving the grant are authorized to waive immunity,
implicitly rely on agency theory--i.e., they proceed from the premise that Congress or the federal
courts may classify certain conduct as waiver-inducing and then infer that those officials who are
authorized to engage in that conduct are, likewise, authorized to waive immunity.
Certification requirements like that described above, meanwhile, have been proposed as the basis
for a waiver regime governing intellectual property rights. Scholars have suggested that Congress
might condition the grant of intellectual property rights to states on consent to suit for violations ofthe
intellectual property rights of others. See Mitchell N. Berman et a., StateAccountabilityfor Violations
of Intellectual Property Rights: How to "Fix'" Florida Prepaid (And How Not To), 79 TEx. L. REV.
1037, 1146-66 (2001) (assessing the constitutionality of a bill that would condition the grant of
federal intellectual property rights to states on waiver of immunity); Meltzer, supra note 149, at 1380.
Professor Meltzer has argued that such a system might be erected either by"requir[ing] a state to enact
a statute waiving its immunity in federal intellectual property cases" or by "requir[ing] every
application for a federal intellectual property right affirmatively to indicate whether it is being sought
on behalf of a state entity and, if it is, to include a certification... that the state will not assert
immunity if sued for infringement under that statutory scheme." Meltzer, supra note 149, at 1386. To
be sure, a waiver scheme of this kind, in any context, will be scrutinized under the unconstitutional
conditions paradigm and questions of coercion and germaneness will abound. See id. at 1381-84.
303 ALl STUDY, supra note 170, at 366.
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